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INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this paper is to reply to the attacks 
made by :~uine in "Two Dogmas of Empiricism"1 and by White in 
"The Analytic and the Synthetic:: An Untenable Dualism" 2 
upon the so-called sharp analytic-synthetic distinction. 
In particular, this essay attempts to show not only that 
these attacks are ill-conceived, but also that Carnap 1 s 
semantic methods can be used to explain analyticity in 
natural languages. 
The two attacks are, in effect, attacks upon the 
conception of the analytic as definitely different from 
,the synthetic. Although they share the same goal and some 
,of the same formulations, they differ in both scope and 
i 
!method. 
I 
'"'uine 1 s attack is directed primarily at three of 
jiCarnap 1 s basic 
'I 
iland semantical 
conceptions--state-description, explication, 
rules. These he regards (for various reasons I, 
I! 
l'gi ven in chapter one) as not capable of explainin'"', the 
fanalytic. White, accepting the sharp distinction for 
I 
'artificial 
,, 
il 
il 
il 
II languages only, attacks the claim that some 
' 
natural language has, the sharp analytic-synthetic distinctio ' 
1willard V.O. Quine, From a Logical Point of View: 9 
Logico-Philosophical Essays (2d ed. rev.; Cambridge:Harvard 
University Press, 1961), chap. ii. 
2Morton White, "The Analytic and the Synthetic: An 
Untenable Dualism", Semantics and the Philoso'Ohy of Language 
ed.Leonard Linsky,(Urbana: The University of Illinois Press, 
1952). 
-------~ r 
1 
2 
Hence, it might be said that White 
:attacks the application of what Quine attacks in principle, 
;I There is an in:portant similarity be tween these two 
·I• ttacks which goes beyond the sharing of common goals and 
;j 
ilformulations, 'Ibis is the mode of attack or, in other words, 
I' ~~their basic argument. Neither Quine nor White attack the 
!distinction itself, but only sorre modern reformulations of 
l'i t, Hence, their attacks, if successful, amount to no more 
jthan a demonstration of the failure of a formulation or two. 
!lin 
ilin 
I 
'I 
' 
I 
'of 
I 
I 
point of fact, both attacks are shown to be unsuccessful 
the discussion in chapter one, 
3oth White3 and Quine~ appear to argue that the failure 
the formulations entails the rejection of the distinction, 
But this does not seem to follow. In many cases 
j'distinctions are 
lor none which is 
I 
employed which have no theoretical formulation 
i: 
considered satisfactory, Metallurgy was 
jdeveloped long before chemistry became sophisticated enough 
'to formulate its working distinctions. And certainly no one 
, is going to demand an end to art critic ism s irr:ply becam~e 
;there is no satisfactory formulation of the distinction 
between good and bad art, In fact, it is recognized that the 
.able critic has developed a method of distinguishing good 
!from bad which, if properly formulated, might provide a 
csatisfactorv formulation of the distinction, 
3Ibid.' p. 286. 
~Quine, op. cit,, p, 37. 
2 
3 
In addition to this non-sequitur on the part of Quine 
and White, there is the problem of a replacement for the 
sharp distinction, Both Quine5 and White6 have mentioned 
sorre sort of gradual ism, but neither has presented it. 'linea 
!it is not presented, it is hardly clearly formulated. Hence, 
lthere seems no reason to prefer gradualism to the sharp 
distinction. And some distinction is required, for there are 
statements such as 1All vixens are foxes• which are not 
I logical truths and which do not seem to require factual 
]knowledge for the establishment of their truth-value, 
I 
I Unless the entire question is to be shelved, the gra.-1ualists 
I, must either 
i 
give up their attack or else present their 
!alternative and show its superiority in some manner, 
I !here is another important reason for attempting to 
explain the sharp analytic-synthetic distinction: it is 
1a historical distinction which probably influenced some of 
I 
I the non-philosophical thinking of the past. As such, it is 
I as important to study it, whatever its merit, as it is to 
!study the politics, econorrics, or science of earlier cultures~' 
,I 
11
1
It is very dangerous to dismiss the col'!cepts of the past 
ilwi thout detailed examination. To do so is to betray an 
I ;jattitude toward the past that makes sarcous study of the 
il 
!'origins of our own culture impossible. For such dismissal 
I 
~~is 
II 
II --~~l-
1 
tantamount to the consideration that earlier thinkers 
5Ibid., p. 20, 
6white, loc. cit, 
3 
4 
:were simply confused. And this 1 ~eems ~: unwarranted. 
The explanation of analyticity offered in the third 
~chapter of this e~say is based uron Carnap 1 s semantic methods. 
I[As such, it imrlicitly bears out the exrlicit re,iection of 
,, 
[Quine's and White's attacks in the first chapter. This 
:theory, however, is based upon a revision of Carnap 1 s basic 
! 
ljsemantical scheme in that it is extensional or referential 
[Ira ther than intensional. This rev is ion does not alter any of 
ithe basic notions attacked by Quina--state-description, 
llexplication, and semantical rules. These are inderendent 
,, 
I !of the question of intensions or extensions. 
This revision, which occupies part of the second 
!chapter, appears to be a gain in clarity and economy over 
'Carnar's own intensional formulation. There is also somethin~ 
of a gain in familiarity of some of the principles involved, 
since the revision replaces Carnar 1 s own attempt to forrraliz,e ! 
talk of' properties with the established language of the class 
!calculus. 
The view of' the analytic presented here preserves the 
sharp distinction between analytic and sythetic and el"phasizes 
the public nature of analytic statements. But it takes 
analytic s ta temen ts as relative to a culture or a subculture, 
e.g., the toolmakers of the culture, and as arising out of' 
technical and/or social orthodoxies. 
This view appears to be supported by certain 
'archeological data, e.g., divergent traditions of toolmaking 
in bordering areas, and by some p~ychological data, e.g., some 
4 
r :__ 
--- --~----
children anpear to regard hornE as tr1e es:c:ertial rcroperty ofi 
cows, while others chooBe their milk-civing ability as 
essential. 
That is, takine; a toolmakinr orthodoxy o;_s evidence of 
a social conception that toolB must be made in a cer~ain 
way, both the archeological and the psycholo[ical data 
annear to show that both children and urimitive ~an have 
conce-ptions of what miE,ht be called 'necessar3• states of 
!affairs'. Sc.lCh necessar;y states, e.('., cow-:-wvirg horns, 
ltool-made-by-chiuping, give rise, upon r·eflection, to 
I 
i general statements such as 'All c owe have horns' e.nd 'All 
tools are chipped cores'. Such sta-cements are not emnirical 
e:eneralizations, but are assertions of these states of 
affairs which are considered necessary. Since they are not 
emuirical generalizations, but assertions of these necessary 
states, they are not falsified by "Lhe occ•.lrrence of except-
ions. Rather it is the exceptions v1hich are lo)ked upon as 
·'bogus. (Several examples of t':tis are given in chapter three. ) 
:Hence, sJch staten:ents have the character of lec.irol&.tions 
or mores. 
The origin of these mores is perhaps trial ·nd error 
and need. Given the economic subsistence level of nrin·itive 
man, any procedure which happens to be discover·ed as hishly 
useful, e.g., in obtainirlt, food, is heavily de a ended upon. 
Since, at the subsistence level, experimentation is liable 
to be suicidal, orthodoxy seems necessary for survival. 
This may not be the sole s:curce of such orthodoxies. 
i 
5 
6 I' 
I 
i 
,I 
~c~~~-c~ ~~=--=If=~~---
- 'I r T ;!n fact, this explanation does not seem to apply either to 
I 
;primitive peoples at economic levels above subsistence or to 
,, 
lichildren. A similar explanation might be offered for children 
I 
1
1by noting that their continual need for demonstrations of 
llaffection and approval indicates an emotional subsistence 
!level. Hence, ttose answers to questions which appear to 
!yield the Sreatest approval of their parents or teachers 
' i 
jbecome the answers. 
I Perhaps the best explanation combines both these 
!elements of dependence with a consideration of the methods of 
i 
ltransmi tting techniques from generation to gereraticn. S~nce 
I 
~any of these techniques ap.tedat~,d- the f~lle!Q development of 
lspeech, and since many such techniques require new terms. for 
,their description, it is likely that gestures ancl actual 
II 
II 
':ferfcrmance of the activity were the most common met'cods of 
!teaching. The apprentice system, stressing mimicry, would 
frobably result in an orthodoxy of method. If combined with 
~Ia fear of deviation from accepted practice, prompted bv the 
'buffets of the teacher, orthodoxy is a very likely result. 
The semantical system based upon Carnap 1 s work serves 
1
as the model for this inter}:retation. The legislative 
I 
!analytic truths are taken in the semantical screme as L-true 
' j,or necessary statements. These may be said to assert neceB9ari}r 
ilstates of affairs, but only relative to a semantical system. 
it-truths are definitely different from factual or F-true 
'statements, being true not only in such a way as to be 
! 
' (\111fa~sifiable,_ b11t_ t.J:'ue_in _!l1.!.Qll a way as _to be consid_ered 
6 
7 
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----------- -
:true by anyone 
I 
who know~ the relevant rortions of the language+ 
I other behavioral-cultural interpretatiors of the semantical 
I 
lischeme are included in the discus~ion of chapter three, 
I! It is important to recognize that this essay contains an 
liexplanation of analyticity using semar:tical methods, It is 
l!not an evaluation of the merit of the notion of analyticity, 
isuch an evaluation arcpears to be very difficult and, in any 
' 
lease, it is beyond the scope of this essay, 
I 
I 
7 
I 
I 
I 
i. 
I 
! 
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C""AFTFR I 
,I 
;I 
I 
Two attacks ur on the so-called sharp anal ytic-synthetici 
I 
distinction are considered in this section: Quine's in "Two 
'Dogmas of Empiricism," and White's in "The Analytic and the 
!synthetic." In effect, both are attacks upon the notion of 
the analytic as public and definitely different from the syn- il 
, II 
1 thetic. li 
Both essays begin by formulating a relation between 
analytic statements, synonymous expressions and logical truth. 1 
White's formulation is: 
'The statement "Every man is a rational animal" is 
analytic just in case it is the result of putting synonyrnsl 
in a logical truth. • • Thus we have logical truth .· 
(1) Every P is P 
From which we may deduce by substitution: 
(2) Every man is a man. 
1 Now we put t;or the second oncurrence of the word "man" thel 
express1.on rational animal which is allegedly synonymous, 
with it, and we have as our result: 
(3) Every man is a rational animal.! 
Quine puts it differently, He writes, 
There is ••• a second class of analytic statements 
typified by: 
(2) No bachelor is married. 
The characteristic of such a statement is that it can be ·, 
turned into a logical truth by putting synonyms for sync- j 
nyms; thus (2) can be turned into (1) by putting •Unmarrieia 
man' for ••• 'bachelor•.2 'i 
The statement referred to by Quine by 1 (1) 1 is 'Noun-
1 Ibid., p. 275. 
2Quine, op. cit., p. 23. 
' .-:==-""--=-----_ 
------=---==:=-==-::..:___---=-:: J ------- -
------
arried man is married' and is supposed to be a logical 
~ruth. This is debatable, since 'un-' is not defined as a 
ogical particle in any standard system. As such, it 
equires a definition if it is not to be ;cratuitous. Quine 
oes label 'un-' as a logical particle, but he does not 
efine it. He writes, 
Statements which are analytic by general philosophical 
acclaim are not, indeed, far to seek. They fall into 
two classes. Those of the first class, which may be 
called logically true, are typified by: 
(1) No unmarried man is married. 
The relevant feature of this example is that it is not 
merely true as it stands, but remains true under any 
and all reinterpretations of 'man' and 'married'. If 
we suppose a prior inventory of logical particles, 
comprising 'no', 'un-', 'not', 'if', 'then', 'and' ,etc. 
then in general a logical truth is a statement which 
is true and remains true under all reinterpr3tations of 
its components other than logical particles. 
The problem here is what is to count as a reinterpret-
ation. Substituting 'canny' for 'married' yields what 
appears to be a reinterpretation. But 'No uncanny man is 
!canny' is false. Hence, there appears to be at least one 
I 
jfalse reinterpretation. And, hence, 'No unmarried man is 
married' does not seem to be a logical truth. 
The problem here is to exclude such statements as 
!reinterpretations. Quine has not provided any basis for 
' It his. 
It might be thought that Quine intends 'un-' to be 
taken as 'non', and hence(l) is intended to be equivalent 
to 'No non-married man is married'. This appears to rule 
9 
However, there is a problem as to the status of 'No 
non-married man is married'. While it is difficult to 
imagine false reinterpretations of this statement, this 
difficulty does not indicate that it is a logical truth, 
Quine's notion of logical truth will not serve unless it 
can be shown that all allowed reinterpr·etations are true, 
Until this is done, his contention that 'No non (or un-) 
married man is married' is a logical truth remains merely 
his contention. 
There is another related difficulty here; there are 
recognized analytic statements which cannot properly be 
taken as analytic according to these formulations. In fact, 
the very statements which cannot be so taken are among the 
statements of essential predication which Nhite says are his 
4 main worry. S.wh statements are, to take White's examples, 
'All men are animals' and 'Every brother is a male'. 
An analytic statement such as either of the above is 
supposed to produce a lo~ical truth upon a synonym substitut-
ion, Substituting 'rational animal' for 'man' in the first, 
the result is 'All rational animals are animals', ·Nhich is 
true, but not logically true according to <{1~ine' s definition, 
Similarly, substitution of 'male sibling' for 'brother' 
yields 'Every male sibling is a male' -.vhich is n0 more a 
logical truth than 'All rational animals are ani~als'. 
The demonstration of this cunsists simply in reinterpreting 
4
vVhit, op. cit,, p.274 
10 
I' 
II 
I' 
'I li 
[l[the nonlogical component 'rational' in the first and j, 
l
''sibling' in the second, For example, replace 'rational' byll 
l
'toy' and 'sibling' by 'attitude'. i[ 
II 
' If it is argued that toy animals are animals and that ·1 
I 
I 
l1male attitudes are male, i.e., in some metaphoric sense of [/ 
j 'Animal' and 'male', then it might be replied that this 
~introduces another complication into ~uinean semantics. 
,[That is, some further rule is needed indicating that state-
l[ments such as these are to be taken as true, :,),Uine has not 
rrovi::dm:::: :er:::~ght that these results only ShOW that I 
I! ! jjthe expressions chosen as synonyms are not synonyms. Hence, 1 
l
ito meet this objection, consider that these statements of 
'[essential predication are sup1•osed to be the result of, or 
~~~ield, logical truths via a synonym substitution. Taking 
!It he logical truths as 'Every A is A' and 'all B are B' , the 
! [!only way to generate 'Every brother is a male' and 'All men 
,, 
:[are animals' from those via one synonym substitution is to 
i 
'[fake as synonym pairs 'men' and 'animals', and 'brother' 
i~nd 'male', This is absurd; the pairs are not even pairs 
I [!of coextensive terms, 
,I 
,[ Quine's at tack upon the notion of analyticity is an 
!I 
[fttack upon what he considers separate recent attempts to 
II 
'I 
,, 
ifxplain this notion. He considers, in succession, 
fnalyticity explained by the state-description, by 
,~on, and by semantical rule, 
_II 
I . 
I 
I, 
I 
,, 
i 
exnlicat- 11 
II 
!I 
! 
11 
'I II I 
I[ 
1: 
I' 
[I According to ~uine, Carnap's notion of the state-
ldescription is: any exhaustive assignment of truth-values 
to the atomic statements of the language. 5 'J:his is not 
ri 
I 
ij 
1: 
II 
!I I, 
ICarnap's formulation, which is: 
which contains for every atomic 
jr 
. . tl 
either this sen- lr 
''a class of sentences. 
sentence 
Jtence or its negaoion, but not both, and 
I 
no other sentences~ [i 
! 
II 
Now, it is co~monly accepted among lo5icians that 
I' 
rjthe assertion of a sentence is equivalent to asserting Ghat 
I it is true. Similarly, den,ying a sen:;ence is accepted as 
~~~'equivalent to asserting its falsity. Hence, ,uine's stace-
[:ment seems to be merely a reformulation of Carnap's. 
ij 
I: 
rl 
I 
I 
I! 
lj 
!I 
jr 
'! However, ,),uine 's conception of the state-description, 'II 
,j 
II 
lior rather, of the list of all state-descriptions, is far j! 
I idifferent from Car nap's. For -1uine considers this list to 
:]be a tabular criterion of analyticity. As he writes, 
\l 
I 
I ,I 
,, 
'I 
I' 
I 
'j 
il 
il 
. c -~ 
'I I, 
A statement is ••• analytic when it comes out true 
under every state-description. But note that this 
version of analyticity serves its purpose only if 
the atomic statements of the language are, unlike 
'John is a bachelor' and 'John is married', mutually 
independent. Otherwise there would be a state-
description which assigned truth to 'John is a oachelor' 
and to 'John is married', and consequently 'No bachelors 
are married' would turn out synthetic rather than 
analytic under the proposed criterion.? 
5,_,u.;ne , p .;t 23 
, 4 0 • C4 • , p. _ • 
6Rudolf 
emantics and l!Iodal Lo ·ic, 
he University of Chicago 
7 . 1 . t 
'<iUl.ne , oc • c 1. • 
in 
I' 
12 
I 
I 
lr 
'I 
--_-_::c:JJ_ 
il 
I 
This notion that the list of all state-descriptions is 
I' a tabular criterion on the order of a truth-table seems to 
The criterion in terms of state-descriptions is a 
reconstruction at best of logical truth, not of 
analyticity.8 
That is to say, since the only truths which Quine 
:]considers to "turn out" under this so-called criterion are 
logical truths, the criterion is, in effect, a truth-table 
for some unspecified compound sentence. 
I 
However, the list of all stat;e-descriptions is not a 
!criterion of analyticity. If anything in Carnap's schema 
is to be chosen as the criterion of analyticity, it is the 
semantical rules. Analyticity is defined in terms of the 
list of all state-descriptions, but this does not make the 
list a criterion. 
'c(;uine' s contention that the onl;y t;ruths which "turn 
; out" in this list are logical truths is contradicted by 
Carnap's explicit assertion that there are non-logical L-
truths.9 Since there are non-logical L-truths, the atomic 
·sentences may contain extra-logical synonym pairs. Analytic 
truths do not "turn out" in c;he list of all state-ciescrip-
tions, because no list is ever constructed or· need be. 
Carnap does define a sentence as L-true in a semant;ic-. 
al system if it holds in every state-description. 10But the 
8
rbid., pp. 23-24 10Ibid., p. 10. 
9carnap, op. cit., p. 15. 
il--- ---
. __ 13 
7 14 
11 criterion is th~---s~-ro-~~tical rules. Carnap writes .-~~~~~==r= ~----
~~~ A sentence Zi is L-true in a semantical s:vstero S if and 
only if Zi is true in S in such a way that its truth 
can be established on the basis of the semantical rules 
of the system S alone, without any reference to (extra-
linguistic) facts.ll 
That Carnap never constructs a list of all state-
descriftions is something that only a survey of his works 
can show. That he does not need to construct such a list is 
evident from the above quote which shows that the list is 
not a criterion. It is also evident from his introduction 
of 1 (x)(Hx=RAx) 1 as L-true in Sl: 12 
the truth of the sentence '(x)(Hx=RAx) 1 can be establishe 
without referring to facts by merely using the semantical 
rules of Sl, • • • and the truth rules for the universal 
quantifier and for '=' ,13 
The semantical rules rererred to by Carnap are: 
11 Hx'-- 1 x is human (a human being)", " RAx'--'x is a 
rational animal' 1 , ann "the English words ••• 'humaY1 being' 
and 'rational animal 1 mean the same. nl4 The rules of truth 
for the universal sentence and the biconditional sentence 
are: 
Zi=Zj holds in a state-description if and onlY if either 
both Zi and Zj or neither ••• hold in it; a universal 
sentence (e.g. 1 (x)(Px) 1 ) holds in a state-descriptlon 
if and only if all substitution instances of its scope 
( •Fa•, 1 Pb 1 , 1 Pc 1 , etc.) hold in it.l~ 
The atoric sentences 'Fa 1 , 'Fb 1 , 1 Pc 1 etc. hold in a state-
description if they are members of, or belong to, it. 16 
11rbid. 13rbid. l')Ibid., p.9. 
12Ibid., p. 15. 14Ibid., p. h. 16Ibid. 
------------------ .~T!b, ~-~-- --:.:..:}--=::: :::·_ c =--- --==--===-
' i
n 
I 
II 
',I 
---r~· -- Hence, it is clea;~that the introduction of non-
llogical analytic truths does not require, according: to 
',I liCarnap, construction of a list of all state-descriptions. 
~~nd hence, since this is a non-logical L-truth, the atomic 
'!sentences of the language need not be independent or devoid 
I 
,iof extralogical synon;;m pairs. 
lbot "turn out", because, as noted above, there is no list in 
And ag,ain, these L-trc.1ths do 
j: 
l'lwhich they "turn out". They are, as this example shows very 
ilclearly, stipulations, not results. 
!,I Quine next considers Carnap 1 s notion of exnlication. 
!I 
fiHence, here too, Quine makes assertions about Carnap 1 s 
llsemantics that are not warranted by Carnap 1 s writings and 
I 
1
1are not detailed enough to be acceptable criticism. "iUine 
!rejects any explanation of analyticity via exnlication 
I 
!! 
!because he considers that explication" rest on notions of 
I 
synonymy. He writes, 
In explication the purpose is not merely to paraphrase 
the definiendum into an outright synonym, but actually 
to improve upon the definiendum by refining or supple-
menting its meaning. But ••• explication ••• does 
rest nevertheless on other pre-existing synonymies,l7 
And this assertion, which is not Carnap 1 s is 
!exnlained by Quine in the followin[' way: 
Any word worth explicating has some contexts which, as 
wholes, are clear and precise enough to be useful; and 
the purpose of explication is to preserve the usage of 
these favored contexts while sharpening the usa~e of 
other contexts. In order that a given definition be 
suitable for purposes of explication, therefore, what is 
required is •• , just that each of these favored contexts 
of the definiendum, taken as a whole in its antecedent 
usage, be synonymous with the corresnondin5 context of 
l7G ..ul' ne , · t 25 op. c 1 , , p. • 
15 
from 
I 
The taa~ of making more exact a vague or not quite exac 
concept used in everyday life or in an earlier stage of i 
scientific or logical development, or rather of replai-9 j ing it by a newly constructed, ~ore exact concept .•• 
This earlier concept, or sometimes the term used for it 
is called the explicandum; and the new concept. Qr.its I 
term, is called an explicatum of the old one. Generally! 
speaking, it is not required that an eX<)licatum have, as 1: 
nearly as possible, the same meaning as the exnlicancium 1'1 
it should, however, correspond to the exDlicandum in I' 
such a way that it can be used instead of the latter/0 ,I 
It is important to note that Quine's statement differj' 
Carnap's in that Quine introduces new notions: refine- i 
I 
1ment and supplementation of meaning, preservation of usage, 
I 
and synonymy of context. Hence, it is difficult to take 
Quine's statement as a paraphrase of Carnap's. It may, how-
! 
ever, be intended as a clarification. And certainly Carnap~ 
statement, especially the phrase 'can be used instead of' is 
puzzling. 
16 
1 Yet, as 
'Ivery difficult 
~uine explains none of his notions, it is I 
I 
li 
to take his statement as a clarification of 
I 
! 
Carnap's. 
'I 
I' Carnap has himself offered something of a clarifi-
cation of the puzzling expression 'can be used 
both his various uses of explication21 and in a 
instead of' in !I 
(dscussion of 1 
just this notion. In neither case does he approach a 
18Ibid., p.25 21 Ibid., pp.8ff. 
19c ·t arna p • , on • c ~ • , 
20Ibid., p.8. 
pp.7-8. 
I 
l ----11-- -
I 
10 II 
'I 17 (1', ... ~ tugg;; ;;;;~Of ;y,~';y;;-,~,f on~ tOXt nr ;,n;;;;,~~toi~;~;;,;;g. ~ ]'-~ 
li Carnap does exrlicitly state that it is wrong to ref!ard 
" 
I the requirement of similarity of explicatum to explicandum 
22 h as vacuous. He points out t at the explicandum itself 
must be clarified by informal discussion. And j t is here 
I that he does mention that certain usages are to be favored 
over others, e.g., •true' not as in •true friend', 'true 
democracy', but as in science, logic, and law as more or 
less having the sense of •correct•, 1not fall"e 1 , etc •. 
But these favored contexts are only those favored for 
' ;clarifying the exrlicandum. The relation of these to the 
: expl ica tum is another matter. 23 
I Carnap notes that the similarity of explicatum to 
j explicand'Jm is not alwa:«s a1> close as even the vagueness of 
'the explicandum permits. He says that "this requirement 
would be too strong, that the actual procedure of scientists 
is often not in agreement with it, and for good reascns. 24 
. These good reasons are: (1) "a scientific concept is more 
!fruitful the more it can be brought into connection with 
' 2') other concepts on the basis of observed facts ••• 
and (2) "scientists appreciate simplicity in their 
concepts. 1126 
22 Rudolf Carnap, Logical Foundations of Probability 
ed.; Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1962), p.lit 
23 Ibid., pp.4-5. 26Ibid., p.?. 
(2d 
24Ibid., p. 5. 
25rbid., p.6. 
11 
Taking Carnap himself as the ~cientist (serrantic;st), 
and his concept of 1- tr,_, th as exrlica tion of (or as 
xr licasu'" of) "w'lat Lei':lniz called necessary trutb and Kant 
nalvtic truth."27 It is ros~ible to see that Carn8r ~s not 
oncerned witt'_ refinement of Kant's or Leibniz' usar-e, For 
arnap does neither eriste!'oloc-v r.or theoJ.ory, and •trne bv 
eaninrs 1 and 1 tr11e in all possible wrrlds 1 wr ld see'!' to 
hange their meaning somewhat without a similar surrounding 
true ture, 
At any rate, while there is no denvir~ that Carnap's 
otion of explication requires fCJ.rther stl_,dv and elaborP.tlon, 
especially concerning the relat'on of similarity between 
explicandum and exr:licatum, it is e•rident that Qnine has not 
1a.de his case. 
Q_uine hir-self expresses his understancing of the notion 
of explication rather differently in a later writing. He 
rites, that in ex,lication, 
We do not claim svnony!"v, vie do not clail'l to make 
clear and explicit what the usPrs of the unclear exrref'si-
on had unccr•sciously in mind all along, He do not exrose 
hidden meanings. • • we supply lacks. 1-Je fix en the 
partic-clar functions of tb.e unclear expression tt:st make 
i.t worth trcnblinf about, and then devise a substitute, 
clear and coucb.ed in terms to o1:r lik1':1g, that fills 
those functions, Be'.'ons those conrE t'n·ns of rartial 
arreement, dictatec bv c:r interests and rurroses, any 
traits of the explicans coce under the head of 11 dor•t 
cares" ••• Under t'lis head we are free to allow the 
explicans all manner of 2r1vel conr·otations never associat-
ed with the explicardum. · 
27 
·carrap, Y:eaning and Necessity, p,8. 
2['Willard V .0. Quine, vlord and Object (Kew 'York: John 
Wiley~ Sons, Inc., l96C), rp.25R-259. 
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Here Q.uine is using 1 explicans 1 where Carnap uses 
I 
11 exrlicatc-m1 , It appears that Qc;ine has ahar.noned his 
earlier insistence on svnom•my of context, ref'nement of 
1 eaninr: and preservation of 1:.sare, He S''f':G>"estfjl,~athflr, 
cc·nditions of partial ar-reement and ~er-e partial PJrniJaritv 
of function. Hhile the matter is still somew'lat clc,dec', it 
seems that Q1Jine has riven up, '>y allowing all manner of new 
connotations to the explicans, his earlier notion that an 
! 
!explication is a kind of definition or redef;n'Ltjc!'l of the 
20 lexplicand1 m, · This is sug-gested by his terminolgical shift 
I 
!from writing 1 definlennum•, writing 1 ex"'licand•"m', as well 
as in the other differences no~ed above, 
'Ihe third of Ca::onap 1 s notions whc.ch Qr i:r.e r1isc'] ~ s e~ 
i in this essay is that of semantical rvles. Since this I 
[r.otion fi~ured in the discuss1on of state-descriptio!'ls, it 
IJis relevant to note that this separate disc11ssioP of each 
II. 
l
1notion, i.e,, state-description, semantical r1:les, anr~ ex-
!Plication, lndicatces a misconstrnction b'r (uir·e of Carnar 1 s 
', 
lj 
1
1
structuring of the analvtic. These are not sepa~Rte 
il 
lldefences ot exrlanations of analyticity as Carnap presents 
' lthem; thev are ptrts of one presentation of a sc'-er"a in which 
anaJ.y~ic statements have a prorer place. 
Quine's attack uron semantical r11lAs, r_o;Jever, is 
I 
far better than any of the other formulations or atta"ks 
llccnsidered here. 
1
,in the following. 
He raisas an il'lJ:Ortant issue succinctly 
He writes, 
'II 
I 
19 
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!'1 Appeal to hvpotnetical lan"uages of an artificially 
: simple kind could conceivably be usef•~l i:-1 clarifying 
i a~alvt~c:ty, if the mental or be~av!oral or c~lt ral 
I factors relevant to analyticitv--whatever they may n 
· be--were somehow sketched into the sirpllfied mo~el,3" 
I 
3ut he does not follow his own suggestion ar.d sketch. 
Rather, he laments the absen~e of consideratlon of these 
factors and says, 
Semantical rules are distlnv•:isbahle, apnarentlv, onlv 
by the fact of appearing on a pare under the headiDg 
•semantical Byles•; and this heading is in itself then 
meaningless,J 
And tlcis is not so, as a rlance at Heaninr and Necessitv' 
reveals, . 
Tne semantical rules include, according to Carrap: 
(i) Rules of for"'ation, on the basis of a clasei_fLce.t 1 on 
of the sic:rs; these r1·les constitute a definition of 
1 sentence 1 , 
(ii) Rules of de·icnation for the primitive d2scriptive 
cons·~ants, nacely, individual constar' s an·~- rre'liee-tes, 
(iii) Rules of truth. 32 (iv) Rules of ranees. 
Each of t':-lese kinds of rules has a definite function, 
and althouch no pa~e is headed 1 Se~antical ?ules 1 such a 
heading would ':::>e no more mearinrless than a ra ··e r.eading 
such as 'List of Defini t',ons' or 'list of Theore~'·S and 
Fetat'leorers' or, for t\cat matter •List of Parts•. 
i Semantical rules, like tl-eore!l's, YetathAorems, r-ea~s, 
I 
plup;s, and tubes, arc distino-uistahle accorr>:t.np; to vJf-Jat thev 
do, .:.. e., accoP'in[': to their :'unction, 
3°Ibid., p.36. 
3libid., p.34, 
32 Carnar, Heanir" & recess i ty, :r .169. 
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I 
'I I ]' However, these errors should not be allowed to I, 
1 
obscure what is valuable in ;:;uine 's attack upon sen::antical ~~~~ 
rules. For what Q,uine apoears to be saying is that Carnap'~ 
semantical rules are purely formal and unrelated to any ' 
I behavioral or cultural phenomena that might be considered 
I 
as relevant to the presence of analytic statements in some II 
![ natural language. In short, ~' .. uine appears to be asking· for .I 
\I 
a behavioral-cultural equivalent of a semantical rule. 
I! Such a demand is valuable, as it points directly at the 
!II 
I, 
our]Jose of formal semantic analysis: explaining the 
phenomena of natural language. 
I' 
II 
I' 
[I 
jl 
1: 
!I ,, I' i] 
.,,, 
1: 
II 
It is unfortunate that ;iuine does not press and 
I
I·,,', Certainly one of the major explain his demand more fully. 
!' problems of logical semantic analysis is the relation of 
the logico-semantical schemas to the data of natural 
I 
d language. !I ·~uine appears to be rejecting Carnap' s purely ,, 
li formal aooroach to semantics, and to be proposing a more !i 
I 
'I applied one of some sort, but exactly what sort is not 
li clear. 
II 
' ;II; 
It may be replied to this that ~uine is, after all, 
I! j! merely writing a critical essay and not a book. Yet, such 
I
ll 
!I 
a sugtestive criticism would benefit from an elaboration of 
I, its implicit point of view. S~ch an elaboration need not 
II 1
1 itself be a full theory of analyticity. Rather, it could 
· be limited to the manner in which these behavioral-i 
lj cultural factors are sketched into the model lan,uage. 
'I c~~-
I 
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n :i ;-Jha t Q-_, ine seems to miss in tris attack 
ljCarna~ is doins neit~er e~iste~olocy -~r anthropolo~v nor 
·I Jsociolo,~y of' lanv.ue.ge, his construct:cn8, or r~es very like 
the~, can be used in·~ the very be~avioral-cultural 
explanatton he so vi~orously denands, 
in the last section of this paper, 
"/hite 1 s essay is primarjly an attack upon i!'vestip-at-:ons 
of the sort menti~ned in this last paraFrapr, rr, to rut it 
1 
better, it is an attack uron attempts t0 say tta t 11 DAr"Dle 
using natural lanrua~es behave as if thev had made rules Por 
their la:nr-uage, 
\vhi te asks those w'--lo undertake suet a tter:pts ":=row do we 
.establish when ~eo~le behave as if thev r,ad "one soP:etring 
iwtich they haven't done?"34 This dermatic assertion about 
i 
'what people haven't done is weakly supported b- Wh~te's 
assertion, 
I s~ppose it would be granted that those who 11se natural 
languare do not make convent:ons and rules o~ definit'o~S 
by making a linc·uistic contract at the dawn of "Jistorv,-
White tten turns to a consideration of three replies 
to his q1 estion. These replies consist sicplv in the 
offering of criterion of aralvtic stetements in ordinary 
languare and are most certainly not the rnlv or the ~est 
replies that could be ~iven, 
'Ihe first rerlv is that of C,I. Lewis. He arpeals to 
331,·,'hite, c"t p 27A or. 1 ., • ·-· 
34Ibid., rp.27P-2 7 '?. 
22 
j]an intuitive insicht or imaginative experiment as to f! 
i whether one criterion in mind includes another, e ,g,, Jj 
[whether the criterion in mind for man includes the criteri- [ 
I on in mind of rational animal. The result of this experi- 'I 
I ment is supposed to be that "I cannot consistently think of,~~ 
'j· .• cannot conceive of, a man who is not a rational [, 
. il 
,j animal. n36 White disposes of this criterion on the grounds ii 
11
1t.hat th4 s sat 4 sfactory,37 i,·j' ~ early retreat to intuition is not ~ 
1.1,. I, 
1'1· The remaining two replies are considered in more 'j 
I li 
'detail, The first of these is: analytic statements are ii 
I 
those whose denials are self-contradictory. White notes 
that not all the denials of allegedly analytic statements 
.I 
Jare of the form of syntactic, or logical, self-contradict-
l,[ions. He further notes that an aopeal to the senses of the 
']component terms to establish the status of a sentence as a 
' . 
self-contradiction is question-begging,38 This does not 
seem necessary. In fact, White's claim is one that 
requires substantiation. 
l,i White discusses a non-question-begging criterion of 
:1 so-called 'self-contradiction' with interesting results. 
ljHe relaxes the syntactic requirement for self-contradiction 
., 
i'and allows in all statements which produce feeling or 
I; 
,!horror or queerness on the part of the people who use the 
II 
]'language. 
' 
i 36 Ibid,, p.279. 38Ibid. 
li 37rbid., n.280. 
_c~~ ~~ 
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:: ~:oting that not all the mel"bet>s of tl'e ls.nc-uan-e-nsing 
I! 
I' jlcO!lll"Ul'J.ity will experience horror at such denialf, ':!rite asks 
I
I '<0 
ri "Who, then?"-'/ Ee also notes that the "error exrerienced 
I 
, at the der>ials of aralvtic stateY!'ents must ~ol"ehow be 
dis tinpuished from the >error at the der.~ als of fir>r:l y 
believed synthetic statements, 
All this is sensible enough, but it in no way warrants 
i'lhite's concl•sion that this criterion is r,oirg to vield a 
e:radualisl"l betv1een ac-alytic and svnthetic statements. It 
is as unwar't'anted as the claim that ':lecaus'' water occPrs as 
j, ice at various ter:peratures in nature, that there is no 
iifreezing point but cr..ly a gradation of freezingneS''• ''lhite 
himself has sugp:ested this analogy awl he rerl ies to 
criticisms as the one above, 
But it should be pointed out that a conception accorrlinp- ' 
to wrich ''a,alvtic" is simrlv the ~i-her ~ogion o~ a 
scale on w~ich "svt~etic'' is the lower repi~n, breaks 
down t"le 't'acJical se~aration of the ar~J,tic ar.r' the 
1
, 0 sythetic as exrress~ve of different klnds of krNrleclrre, ·· 
Apain, while this re·r ly is varr·.·.e and Y>Oet.a:rro!'ical, :1. t 
can clearly be sean that whe.t it says need not 'Je so, A 
scale could be constrv.cted on which all synthet:c statements 
, have num':Jers less than zero, ard all anal ''tic oneo ncm:ters 
creatsr than or equal to zero. The kinds of !•nowledre 
: exr:ressed by each kind of statement could be as different 
as you please, This is ohvlo~slv not what White wants, 
but he has not sho\m why this cr'_lld not be the case, 
II 
li 
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The second criterion receivi~g White's detailed 
consideration is tte term-withol~J.Dr criterion, This is 
appare:-tly a c:c>i terior: of ~-cnonymy. It is etated as: if 
we were presented witt so~ething that wasn't a rat:~nal 
animal, we l1'Tld not call it a man. After a· ain noting 
'I 
1 that not all the members of the lansua·-e comn:uni ty 11ould 
:· 
' 
1
' wi thold the term, White ima[ines two experimcm ts i rvol ving 
native sub~;ects. There imagined experin,ents are euq:osed 
to sLow sof!'ett:ing about the proposed criterion. In far t, 
they serve only to illustrate White's mettodolorical 
i • / 
•nalvete. 
The first of these imagined experif!'ents invr-1 ves the 
checking of a translation bv anthropol<'o:ists. 
antt:ropolorists have concluded from their investi"'ations 
:that whereas 'rear 1 ard 1 rational anbml' are S'mcnymnus in 
the native lanrcuape, '!"an •and 1 feat'cerless biped 1 are onlv 
coextensive, White in:arlnes himself checking th's by the 
simple procedure of s'l.owing the natives various thinvs, 
saying the nati•Ie Hor" for 'man 1 and a-,,a1_tinr native assent 
or dissent. And s:nce during this imapired investi~ation, 
the natives called, i.e., assented to the calling of by 
:1tfulte, neither non-featherless bipeds :r1or nor-rat:.onal 
animals, '1Jhite concludes that (1) " •• • such cr-Jde 
, behaviorism will not avail.'' and, puzzlinglv, that (2) 
''the criterion, theref~re, is one that will not help us 
- make the dis tine tion. n41 The distinction here is, arparer ~1 v • 
4libid., p.2Q3. 
18 
as to 
tte n•erit of the distirction is that if the first conclusion 
is SOl).nd, and it see~s to be, the second is ~ot. For if 
the procedures for apr'-yintt the crit"rion 2.re unso•1nd, the 
criterion has not been properl•· applied, a~d ~c conclusion 
can be drawn as to its merit, 
That s•Jch r rocedures as White em,:loys in 1-'is imarined 
ex,:eric~ent !'lay well be unsound can ">e seen not only from 
the consideration of limitations of pointinr, e.rr., it is 
ambig- ous as to spatial and teP:poral srrearl, hut also from 
consideration of the struct·1re of nati'.•e lanruaP"e, H~i te 
is sayinp slngle native expressions, not whole native 
ser:tences. Or, rather White is usinf so-called native 
~ • 1 d t h I ( t' ' ' ) 1 worr;.s as slnp e wor ser; .e::--_ces sue_ as ClS ;_s a 
I! 
r ... an'. 
'I li 
!I 
It rr,ay '::e t'lat thA struct;re of the native larP:'1afe is 
such that the same expression used as a se~tence differs 
from its use in a more than sinfle word sentence. 
experiment is carried on in utter ipnorance cf such 
conslderaticns. 
White's second imagine~ ex,:erirrent has slif~tly 
different conditions in that he is able to converse with 
natives. He asks t'ler, 11 Ar·::1' t you s··rer in conclncJinr: 
that so:rething is not a man from the fact thet it i1< not 
a rational animal, than you are in c onclwl ir P" it from the 
f t th t it . t f t' 1 bi~P.d?. 11 lL2 ac a lS no a ea ner ess ~ .. AJ'1d c-etting an 
112 Ibid. 
===41"= --·- -
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affir;;;~-tr~-~ answer (which is surprisinf" considering the 
length and difficulty of the question), White concludes he 
has, 
a criterion 
of' degree, 
better sign 
property of 
which makes of the distinction 
Not being a ~qtional animal is 
of' the absenc·3 of manhood than 
not being a f'eatherless biped, 
a matter 
simply a 
:Is th~ 1 
• • • I 
Aside f'rom the two non-sequiturs, i.e., concluding from li 
answer a criterion and a grailuallstic notion of synonvmY !I, 
or analyticity, the assertion that not being a rational 
animal is sirrply a better sign of the absence of' manhood 
!that is not being a f'eatherless biped is absurd. Bipedity 
is an easily observable property; children of' two years 
lnotice it regularly. But rationality, f'ar from being easily 
I 
~~bservable, itself' req. uires a criterion, If, to f'ollow 
i hite solely f'or the :ourpose of' argument, rationality is 
I 
[taken as an observable property, e. g., coherent and appropri-
i 
ji
1
ate behavior, then 
' eatherless bipeds 
it is dif'f'icult to see why t~ose 
(on this planet) who act incoherentlv 
re commonly taken as erring or ill human beings and not 
erely as animals. 
:rb return to the non-sequiturs in White's argument, it 
s obvious that an af'firmative answer to this questirn does 
the making of' a criterion whether of' degree or 
Degrees of f'elt certainty, and that is what is called 
or here, are coT'·patible with as deep an analytic-synthetic 
43~. 
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r ~~--synonvr:citv-coexter-dvitv ,_,i-stl~ction as Is imaairq"le, 
I One n:ay ':le uncertain or sure about anvthinv fer mary 
reasons other than those relevant to Wt1te•s criter!on, 
Ignorance, ane:er, a d,~.sire to rlay von or del'"or, etc, car 
prompt unlirr•i ted aroounts of <'cgmatisl"'. ~UT'1ils.rlv, sm'le 
fear cJc•[":r:atism to the point of never decic:rP" even s:mrle 
matters without great deli'ceration. vJ"ite has not shown 
that this test, if it is that, shows what he cla:l'"s it 
shows. 
The notion that statements of esse,-ctial pred:catioe1 or-
n~n-logical aralytic statements senerallymerely express 
better sir:ns than generalizations such as 1All men are 
' 
I 
:j 
j, 
li . 
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featherless blpeds 1 is, as noted abo~re, a poor one. Corrmon-j 
I 
'I 
,I 
il 
'I 
I 
sense reflect:on upon the historv of human social ard politi 
cal life in this century alce1e should suffl ce to proFpt the 
recognition that man's :c>at"onality is a sometime So 
long: as 'rat1onalitv 1 rreans 1 ap-reabilit'T to ar!""ument 1 , 
White's apparent cla~rr that rationalitv is one of the better 
observable signs c:· machood runs contrary tc the staterrel"ts 
of b.istory. 
A much more cbviot~s approach to ex· lalning aral vt; city 
consists in taking the label 1 statemerts of essertial 
predication•, which tradition applies to non-lo~ical 
analytic state~cents, at face valne, Qc·ire mentions just 
such a construction in passing. 
The Aristoteliar' notion of essence was the forerunner, 
----·---
-------
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n no doubt, of t~e ~oaern rotion of l.~tens~cn or me~n~n~. For Aristotle :'_t was esse·"t'al in l"'CJY1 to ".e rot::oral, 
accidental to be two-lepged. ~ean 1 nR lP w~at efsence 
beco"1es 'Aihen it :s divorced frcl"' ~roe ob5ect of 
reference ar" ''edded to the Her". "'-
As statements predicating essences, non-lopical 
analvtic statements are st9.tements of a kir'.d of concerts. 
Hence, it wc··ld seem that to follow the 0•!nnan ~e~an~ for 
the consideration of the behavioral or cult•1ral factors 
relevant to analyticity is to u!"dertake a st1:dy of the 
29 
'ii behavioral or c•.1ltural bases of this kind of forr-,ation. 
" I' 
!I 
I 
1 
Of course to de so is or.ly to sstisfy part of this demand; 
these factors have also to be sketched into the model 
languac-e. 
It is lnter0sting to cote that Quine Is owr stud't of the 
I 
! 
" I; 
I 
11 
rl psycho.logy of lar:p;•Ja,r~e in '!lord and Ob iect !'lePlPcts the tonic 'I 
! 
of cone er t-forn,at l on. He writes all around it, mel"t'rnlng 
i il 
II li 
the relativity of ontology and of serterce si~nlficance to 
a given theory: 
I Unless pretty firrn2.y and directly conditioned t~ 11 
sensory stimulation, a sentence S is !'leanirp-less 2xcept , 
re:La ti ve to its own theory; meanir ple ss in tertheor"!tic 81'1-! 
y.LJ.;, The statementc are about posited eni t:t tiGs, are ' 
s i t:nifican t only in relation to a surrounding body of 1 
t~eory, and are :ustifiable orl~ b7 ~upp~~~sntinr ' 
obeervat'.on 'dith scientific r"ethod ••• ·! 
He describes the origins of speech in t~e c~ild as ftei~forced 
operant bel:avicr l'roc'!,.•cing mimicr:ft7 , and the develr-pment 
from ttis basis of one-word or occasion sentences. Fe 
notes tr.e c lfference between the child 1 s res· ·1 ting 
44Quine, Fror a Lcdcal }oint of View, p.22. 46 rbid. 
~5Quine, ':lord and Object, p.24. 4 7Ibid. ,p. f. 
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conce~tual sche3e and the a~••lt conceptual sche~e of ! 
- i 
Fobile and end• ring physical objects, which are the referents 1 
of the terms in adnlt languaro-e,4P But he does not exrlain il 
either the origins of, nor the c~an·es in, the adult concept-l'li 
ual sche!'e, }.:or, for that matter, iB t':le:>e anv account of 
',,I 
l
the chan~es in the child's conce9tual sche~e ar he r:radually 
I! I' pror:resPes toward a p:rasp of a<lt·l t lanp1.•are anil concP-rts, 
1: 11'1,· j Q·1~ne does mention both the e:vnon:nny-coextensivei ty 
:I 
':distinction for torms and the arelvtic-synthetic distinction i! ii 
I 
I' for sentences, but merelv a2 by-p:'oducts of l~nrua~e Jl 
learning.49 He adrits that "t"ese are still not behav:oristi~ 
reccnstructlons of intuit~ve se0an~ics, but only a 
behavioristic ersatz.''50 
T'ois is a rretty obvic·;s ',ndicatlon that Qu'ne is 
dissatisfied with his oxrlal"at:C:On of analytic:tv, Why he 
d!d not abandon it and attemrt another on different lines is 
puzzlir~. Certa1nly, as can he seen from the cltat1ons in 
thiS chapter, it is "'Ct brcause the rrobleJ11 is u~irteresting 
to h il'l. 
At any rate, conElderat~on of thes9 two attack~ has 
shown that they c:re c·ct s:.:ccessful as attacks, As sources 
of suggestions ar.d as rh:aoscrhical exreriments of a sort 
they are very -~ssf·,:l. Quine 1 s s·• ""fiBS tion that the behavioral 
and cvl tural fac to~·s relevant 
L: r: 
11:?.1..2·· fp.92-93. 
li'. 666 
· Ib1.d,, pp. -7. 
to analyticity be 
50ibid., p.66, 
sketched into 
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lfhe simplified model languafe is followed in the discussion 
[, 
I of the last chapter. And White's experiments, in their 
,I very lack of success, suggest that this naive method of 
i·r directly questioning native subjects is not useful. 
I' One useful method, which combines ~uine 's suggestion 
i wiLh White's comment that analytic statements are state-
1[ ments of essential predication, appears to consist in 
'l
:i studyint the behavorial and cultural data relevant to the 
conception of essential properties and in attemDting to 
[, 
II sketch such data into a model language. 
'I The next chapter is devoted to the building of the 
il 
j! model language. The last, to the consideration and 
'!1 interpretation of the data as well as the sketching of it 
il 
lr 
l1 ,, 
,, 
I 
into the model. 
j 
II 
I 
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CPAFTER II 
Carnap's semantic analysis, unlike those considered pre-
viously in this paper, proceeds by the constructjon of 
artificial formal language systems. This formality and 
artificiality de not exclude consideration of ordinary 
name languages such as English, for the metalanguage of Pome 
of these artificial systems, e.f., Sl, is a portion of the 
English Language, Nor, taking Carnap at his word, does the 
formality appear to exclude consideration of the epistem-
i 
ology of language. In fact, the distinction between in-
tensions and extensions is apparently epistemological. That' 
is, intensions and extensions are distinguished on the basis 
of conditions of knowledge. Fore specifically, whereas 
understanding the designator is a sufficient condition for 
understanding the intension of the designator, it is not 
sufficient for understanding its extension. Carnap writes, 
A designator stands primarily for its intension; the 
intension is what is actually conveyed by the designator 
from the speaker to the listener, it is what the listener' 
understands, The reference to the extension ••. is 
secondary; the extension concerns the location of appli-
cation of the designator, so that, in general, it cannot 
be determined by the listener merely on the basis of his 
understanding of the ~esignator, but only with the help 
of factual knowledge. 
j However, Carn,p, ,;nc•e .l ,v .1,, ;.L.ue this distinction, 
'neglec"cs epistemology to the detriment of his analysis. It 
is one of the purposes of this section to sho,v ~hat Carnap 
cannot consistently neblect or dismiss epistemology while 
I doing a semantic analysis which rests on such a distinccion.l 
~~ Before showing this, however, there is some urepara- ! 
li tory of background macerial that must be piesented. 
il Intensions and extensions can be properl;y incrociucecl only 
li after discussion of formal language systems, metalanguage, 
ill se;nantical rules, and state-descriptions. 
~ I 
1 j A simple example of a tormal lantuage system is Sl. 
lr Sl consists of a portion of che notation of symbolic logic, 
'I \I 
i! plus nonlogical constancs of both individual( subject) :md 
!! p1edicate types. Truth-functional connectives for nega-
i 
tion, disjunction, conjunction, material implication, and 
material equivalence, plus individual variables and univer-
, sal and existential quantifiers comple·te the basic notation. 
I 
[In addition, there is the iota-opera~or for individual 
II 
~~descriptions and the lambda-operator for property or class 
li . 2 
[I expressions. 
I[ In order for the shapes of Sl to be used to make 
,!descriptive expressions, including statements, it must be 
:I 
" 11i supplemented by M. l\1 is the metalangu&f:.e of Sl. It con- il 
1: II 
jj tains portions of English sui table not only for the descriptf 
1
1
1 ive interpretation of Sl, but for the discllssion of the :: 
!I 
ljexpres~ions of Sl and its interpretation as well. Hence, It 
I c'.Ib . d 3 4 II 
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r: 
II 
: 
' 
33 
3 
c~ --=~ir.t contains; in=ad(H_tfon to th~ d~-;~~iptiv~ch1t~rpretatio~sc~r 
'I of the non-logical constant~ of ~1, nar:ces of the de,criptive ii 
I, 1. 
1
1 
interpretations, namos of the expressions of ."'1, anrl certain 
semaiCtical terms. The descriptive interpretation of the 
nonlof!ical constants of Sl is p:iven bv the rules of designati .. 
on: 
1 s 1 is a symbolic translation of "··IR-lter ."'cott' 
1w1 --•(the book) Waverly' 
1Hx•--•x is human (a humar. being)' 
1 RAx 1-- 1 x is a rational animal' 
1 Fx 1 -- 1 x is (naturally) featherless' 
'Bx'--'x is a biped' 
1 Axy 1-- 1 x ls an author of y' 
In addition, Carnap indicates that "The Bn.o:lish words 
used here are supposed to be understood in such a way that 
'human being' and 'rational animal' mean the same."-1 
This last does not appear either in form or in function 
to be like the other rules of desio:nation. That is, it 
neither states exr;licitly a rule of svmbolic tranrlation 
cor contains any of the svmbols of ~1. The point is that 
1Hx 1 and 1RAx 1 are both to be translaterl as 1x is human 
(a human being)' and 1x is a rational animal•. Thi~ co,olc> be 
done simply by listing both translations orposite both 
1Hx' and 1RAx'. Alternatively, since the rurpose of this 
rule is to legitimize 1 (x) (Hx=RAx) 1 as true by the ser'antical 
rules of Sl alone, this rule need not be taken as a designa-
. tion rule but as some other kind of semantical rule of rano:e 
for '(x)(Hs=RAx) 1 • This alternative will be 
3Ibid., p.4. 
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presented in the discussion of rules of ranges below. 
An ato~ic sentence is defined as: any predicate of 
'I'' 
' degree N, i.e., having free occurrences of N different 
variables, followed by N individual constants.4 Carnap 
does not give specific rules of formation, such as this 
one, for non-atomic sentences, but the examples used throuph-: 
out the book indicate that the common rules of formation 
apply. 
The rule of truth for atomic sentences of defl'ree 1 
I 
is: an atomic sentence of degree 1 is true if the individual', 
to which the individual constant refers has the property 
to which the predicate refers. This rule obviously 
presupposes the rules of desi11:nation, since there is no 
referring to individuals or properties without such rules. 
}lore complex sentences, both atomic (of degree greater 
than 1) and non-atomic, have similar rules corresponding 
to their truth-tables. Quantified sentences will be 
discussed shortly. 
Having more or less in principle introduced the 
notion of the truth of a denial of an atomic sentence and 
the notion of the truth of a material biconditional sentence, 
Carnap is in a position to introduce the semantical terms 
'false' and 'equivalent'. A sentence is false if its 
negation is true. Two sentences are equivalent if their 
, rna terial biconditional is true. 5 
4rbid., p. 5. 5.!£1.2.., p. 6. 
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'I I, The L-concepts are introduced next along with the il 
li 
I 
:!concepts of state-description and range. The L-concepts 
I~ 
:
1
are explicata for certain concepts which, according to 
.lcarnap, have been used by philosorhers for many years without 
,lbeing satisfactorily defined. For example, L-truth is the 
rlexplicatum for truth based on purely logical reasons or on 
I 
!,meanings, rather than fact~, 6 
A state-description in g1 is a class of sentences of 
Sl which contains for every atomic sentence either this 
!sentence or its negation but not both, and no other 
: 
:·sentences. 7 
That class of all those state-descriptions in which a 
sentence holds is its range. Generally, sentences are said 
to hold in a state-description if they would be true if 
all the sentences of the state-description were true. For 
atomic sentences and the denials of atomic sentences, 
holding in a state-description is the same as belonging to 
it. Or, since no state-description has both an atomic 
sentence and its denial, the denial can be said to hold if 
.the sentence does not. Disjunctions of atomic sentences 
and/or denials of atomic sentences hold if both or neither 
!hold. Universally quantified sentences, treated as con,iunc-
tions of their substitution instances, are true in a state-
. description if all their substitution instances hold. 
The range of an L-truth (in Sl) is every state-
description (in Sl), Tautologies such as 1Hs V -Hs• and 
6
rbid., p_._lo_. 7 Ibid., p. 9. 
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6 
1 (x) (Bx=3x) 1 can be seen to beL-true, since wherever 
1Hs 1 fails to hold, 1 -Hs 1 holds and vice-versa; and wherever 
1Bs' or 1 Bw 1 holds or fails to hold, 1 3s' or 'Bw' holds 
or fails to hold. 
The ease with which such logical truths can 8e seen to 
_ t 37 
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be L-truths can be misleading in at least two ways. First, il 
•
1
1 it can be taken as indicating that there are no problems 11 
I I ~~about the notion of L-truth. And second, it can be taken as ! 
\indicating that a list of all state-descriptions amounts to 11 
I 
I, :no more or less than a truth-table for A statement formed 
il jby co~ecting all the atomic statements of the language 
I 
system. 
That a list of all state-descri~tions cannot be taken 
simply as a truth table can be seen in at least two ways. 
First, because there are non-logical L-truths, e.g., 
1 •(x) (Hx=RAx)•;8and second, because state-descriptions are 
1
1 
descrirtions of possible states of the universe of indivinual~: 
1
with resrect to the properties of the system. 9 As a II 
!description of a possible state of a universe, a state-
description differs from a truth-value assignment in a truth-
table by being semantic or interpreted rather than merely 
logical or syntactical. The possibility it states is not 
simply logical, but interpreted. And this creates a problem, 
for the construction of a list of all state-descriptions 
for a language system such as Sl is not entirely mechanical. 
8~ •• p.l5. 9~ •• p.9. 
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1 Since -.(:;)-C~~=RAx) 1 l;_a_n_ L-trut;~ no ~~a te-de-~crlption can l-
contain 'Hs' if it does not contain 1RAs•, and vice-versa. 
But there is a problem as to whether any state-description 
need contain 1Hw 1 • Tb include 1 Hw• in a state-description is 
)to say it is possible for the book Waverly to be a human 
being. And this seems peculi~r. 
'Ihe definition of a s ta te-d•'lscription requires that 
'revery atomic sentence or its denial be present. There is 
! 
no corresponding definition for 'every s tate-description' 
!requiring that all atomic sentences and all denials of 
i 
':atomic sentences be present somewhere in the list of all 
state-descriptions. So, there appears to be no need to 
' )include troublesome sentences such as 1 Hw 1 in some state-
!descriptions. However, it seems preferable to have a rule 
i 
!stating explicitly the exclusion of 1Hw' from all state-
Fescriptions. Such a rule is: ••-Hw 1 is an L-truth (in 
I ~1)•. For reasons similar to t~ose advanced for 1 Hw 1 , it 
I 
fis well to consider 1 -Bw 1 , 1 -Aws•, 1 -Aww', and '-Ass• as 
-truths. 
A list of such rules is not supplied by Carnap, but 
addition of such a list does nnt seem inconsistent with 
arnap's intentions. In fact, such a list of non-logical 
I 
-truths, as a list of statements hol~ing in every state-
escription (in Sl), seems to be merely an addition to the 
ules of ranges. Such a list is a very convienient place 
n which to state that 1 (x) (Hx=RAx) 1 is an L-truth. 
n I ----
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I 
of all state-descriptions. Stipulations of L-truths, 
-___ [ist There is another problem in the construction of a 
both logical (by the rules of ranges) and non-logical 
(by the rules of designation or as above), serve to exclude 
certain sentences or sentence pairs from occurring in any 
I state-description. But there is no rule giving the number 
I of occurrences of, e. g., 'Fs 1 • There are r,.,les such as 
l[••(x) (Hx=RAx) 1 is L-true' which specify that the number of 
!occurrences of 1 Hs 1 is the same, and occur in exactly the 
same state-descriptions, as those of 1RAs 1 • But the 
! !statement could beL-true with no occurrences of either 
I 
I 
'RAs' or •Hs 1 anywhere in the list of state-descrlptions. 
Of course, as noted above, excluding •RAs 1 and 1 Hs 1 from 
every state-description makes their negations L-truths, 
and this cannot be done without having or making a rule to 
that effect. Yet, given such a rule, 1 {x) (Hx=RAx)' would 
I still be L-true, since its substitution instances, e • g.' 
I 
II i I 
1 Hs=RAs' would all hold in all state-descriptions. li, 
I This problem does not appear to create any difficulties 
for Carnap•s analysis, but it is a problem for those who 
: 
wish to consider the list of state-descriptions as a truth- 'I 
I 11 
table. The construction of a list of state-descriptions is I 
not only not mechanical, as is the usual procedure for 
truth-tables, but is, with eertai~ ex~eptions, not possible. 
The certain~ exceptions to this are the positional languages, 
languages whose individuals are numbers or ordered N-tuples 
of numbers and wl1C)S e _Ered!ca tes are rratherr!l j;ie!!l, _:3_ld<:lh .. --· 
I 
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ntroduces L-falsitv, L-implication, L-determinacy ar.d 
-equivalence. A sentence is L-false if its denial is 
-true. A sentence L-implies another, if their material 
I cndi tional is L-tr•·e. Two sentences are L-equivalent if 
!their material biconditional is L-true. And any 8entence 
I 
l
'·s L-d·1terminate if it ie either L-true or L-false. 11 
:f Sentences which are true but not L-true are F-true. 
lkence, there is F-falsity, F-implication, and F-eo_uivalence. 
~~ny F-true or F-false sentence is L-indeterrdJOate. 
I Equivalence and L-equivalence are extended to desip:nat-lf 
ors other than sentences: to predicators (predicate express-
~~ions) and individual expressions. Any two predicators of 
lithe sarre degree are equivalent if their full senterces (with 
'lthe same sequence of individual expressions) ·are eq•;ivalent. 
I 
IIf the sentences are L-equivalent, then the '·~-equivalent; if not, then F-eq11ivaler.t. predicators are 
In a language system with predicator variables a 
similar definition C011ld be made for the equivalence 
(L-and F-) of individual expressions. Since Sl lacks 
II 
:I 
[; 
II 
il 
I; 
'I 
' I 
'these, 
II 
II I~ 
I' the definition for equivalence of indivinual expressi- 1 
I 
I 
ons is sirrplv that they are equivalent if they nam" the 
same thlng. Carnap does not say that individual expressions 
can be L- or F-equivalent, but it would seem that they can 
be either. For example, 
10 
Ibid., p. 87. 
1 the author of Haverly' is 
11Ibid., p.ll. 
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Scott•. These modifications could simply be stipulations 
in the rules of designation to the effect that 'Scott• 
jnames 
I 
the same t>oing as 1Sir 1.valter Scott•. 
Carnap next introduces the intensions and extensions. 
IFor predicators, the extensions are the corresponding 
I
I 12 
·!properties. 'Ihese are choices or decisions, not 
['conclusions. But Carnap does offer a few appeals to make 
1the choices seem familiar. And these appeals, rather than 
lmaking the choice of properties as intensions seem familiar, 
1
make them appear arbitrary. 
'I I, 
il I~ 
I 
lr 
I 
:I 
I! 
il 
1: 
'I 
li 
i 
Carnap notes that it is cus tomar:v in analysing the jt 
~meaning of an adjective in a name language or of a predicator .
1
_1 
lin a symbolic language to speak of two entities--classes 
1 and properties. He remarks that talk of the two kinds differs 
! 
~~essentially in that the identity condi tiona for classes and 
!,!property are not the same. Classes are identical if they 
lhave established identity conditions. Carnap decides to 
rectify this situation by regarding two propertie~ as 
identical if it can be shown bv purely logical means 
1
(including semantical rules) that whatever has one property 
!also has the other. 
He takes properties as identical if predicators for 
them are L-equivalent. Since he has stipulated that L-
equivalent predicators have the same intension, he chooses 
12!2J.;!., p. 19. 
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properties as the intensions of predicators. 
Properties are not the only possible choices for 
intensions of predicators recop-nized by Carnap. The cla1>s 
of predicators L-equivalent to the ~iven prenicator is 
,: another. ,, This he considers less natural, since it is a 
!! linguistic entity rather than an extra-linguistic one. 1 1 
There is another choice for intensions of pre~icators 
which seems not only more natural in view of the choice of 
classes as extensions of predicators but also preferabl~ 
,for several other reasons. This is classes give by rule, 
e.g., the class of primes greater than one ann less than 
seven. That is, it i~ preferabl'e if the choice of extensions 
for predicators is classes given by enumeration, e.g., the 
class containing 2,3, S. If C:arnap 1 s choice of ex tens tons 
for predicators is classes given by rule,then t>-is other 
choice of intensions is not preferable. For Garnap insi~ts 
that in general extensions and intensions are different. 
It is not clear that Garnap has chosen classes given 
by enumeration as extensions of predicators. There are 
certain statements that make this seem verv likelv, and none 
that explicitly deny it. 
Perhaps the clearest statement that the extensions of 
predicators are classes given by enumeration occurs in 
Carnap's assertion of the impossibility of the elimination of 
,properties or intensions for predicators. He writes: 
l3Ibid. 
42 
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I 
the question might be raised ••• whether it could not 
happen in some system that a predicator has only an 
extension; .•• that it refers to a class without 
referring to any of those nroperties which have that 
class as extension. I think ••• this is not possible 
in a semantical system. • • • It is not possible to 
refer to a class without referring to at least one 
of the corresponding properties. This holds, even 
if the class is specified by an enumeration of its 
n:embers, e.g., by a phrase like 1 the cla"s of the 
:Lndi vidu:1ls a, b, ana c 1 , • • Te1is nredicator does 
not lack an extension; it is the pro,
1
oerty of being 
(identical with) either a orb or c. 4 
lit han 
Since this seems to make the required point better 
any other of earnap 1 s statements, there is little to 
! 
i1gain by quo tint; further. 'l'he epistemologic2l c twracteriza-
'1 
j!tion of extensions as concerning the location of application 
I': of designators and as determined only by factual knowledge 
1: 11also appears to support the notion that the extensions of 
,, 
'I 
:predicators are classes given by enumeration, but the SUFI-
' iport is not explicit. It seems that what Carnap has in 
mind is some kind of empirical investigation, but what kind 
is not clear from his remarks. 
At any rate, supposing that this quoted statement is 
taken as establishing that the extensions of predicators 
,are classes given by enumeration rather than by rule, the 
:advantages of taking classes given by rule as intensions of 
:Predicators can be stated. 
Tne first advantage concerns the epistemological 
distir1ction between intensions as actually conveyed by the 
designator and extensions as concerning the location of 
14Ib'd 
__ ~_., p. 111. 
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/[application of the designator. Taking properties as the 
)~ntensions of predicators, is not at all clear that their 
/iapplication, i.e., application of predicators understood as 
I ~~roperty expressions, would result in a class rather than 
I' 
]lsimrly a bunch. Classes, as is well-known, have definite 
!'characteristics of identity and inclusion, But there is no 
,:reason why these characteristics should be ascribed to the 
!, 
'lgroup of things considered as the extension of a propert:v-
!1predicator. That is, there is no reason to regard clasres as 
• resulting from the application of rroperty express 'cons. 
On the other hand, if the intensions of predicators are 
I 
i'classes given by rule, it is quite natural to take their 
I 
,application as having the characteristics of classes. 
Another advantage of taking classes given by rule as 
'the intensions of predicators is that the class calct,lus 
'allows definite decisions as to the inclusion, exclus~on, 
or identity of one intension and another. This is not the 
case with properties, For example, where it is possible 
to, at best, argue that the property Featherless Biped 
somehow includes both the properties Featherless and Biped, 
it is possible to say that the class of all Featherless 
,Bipeds is the intersection of the classes of Feathered Thin.P'S 
and Bipeds. This allows talk of intensions not only to be mo:r;e 
~-l specific, but also more fruitful. 
This notion of greater frui tfulne8s is not vac,,ous. 
It is a kind of economy in that the same notions have more 
useful consequences. Properties are identical, according 
44 
14 
to Carnap, if predicators for them are L-equivalent; and 
the L-equivalence of predicators is known only by knowing 
the rules of designation. So, apparently the only way in 
1
which anyone can krow that two predicators have the same 
property is by knowing the rules of designation. 
to say that the identity conditions of properties 
Taking intensions as classes given by rule, the situation is 
somewhat different. Certainly, the identity of the intension 
of 'rational animal' and 'human' does not follow from class 
ltheory, but given this as a rule of designation, the identity 
I 
1
of 'brown-skinned rational animal' and 'brown-skinned human' 
follows without any addi ticnal rule of designation except 
that introd1:.cing the predicate 'brown-skinned 1 in to the 
system. 
Carnap does little to remove the obscurity of 
properties or any of the other choices of intensi0ns. After 
I 
I i 
'saying that properties are not 
,linguistic or as mental in the 
to be taken as either [: 
manner of imae:es or sense-data,!'l 
things have1 5, Carnap offers 1
1 
a speculative account of the knowledge of the properties II 
', 
expressed by compound predicators. Compound predicators 
are those formed by connecting the basic predicators with the 
connectives of the language system, e.g., 1-F' is a componnd 
predicator in Sl, as is 1H&-F 1 • These require an extending 
of the use of such connectives from sentences alone to 
!predicators. Since some 
1 l5Ibid., p.20. 
of these predicators express 
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roperties not occurring in nature, e • g.' tp &F', knowle., ge ---[! 
-- I 
of corrpound predicators need not be 1erived from experience 
of things exemplifying them. According to Carnap, such 
compounds are understood by understanding the cornponents. 16 
This is not to say that a con.pound predicator can onlv be 
I 
'understood in this manner; some., e.g., 1 F&B 1 can be 
!understood by experience. It is to say that no compound 
!.need be understood directly, according to Carnap, 
I There are several difficulties with this speculative 
lr: epistemology. 
properties is 
First, as noted above, the compounding of 
indefinite. Carnap has not shown how any 
1
compounding of the property Human and the property ~en Feet 
Tall produces the compound property Human and ~en Feet Tall. 
[,Common sense can complain that this is obvious, but commr-n 
ljsense is either using, illegitimately, class notions, or is 
~~simply speaking vagu.ely. . .j 
1
1 The second maJOr diff1cultv is that corrpounded pronert-[
1 1[ ies are not always something that things have, They, in I: 
I some cases, e.g., 'H&-RA' are impossible (according to the ![ 
1 
semantical rules of Sl). Carnap calls unexemplified ~~ 
properties 'empty' and impossible properties 'L-enpty', but 
does not explain how they are physical characters of any of 
the individuals {inclujing a*) of the svstem i.e., Sl,l7 
This inadequate treatment of properties is not the 
only, or the n.os t objectionable, example of Carnap 1 s neglect 
of epistemology. The most 
16 
.!2!£·· p.21. 
objectionable 
17rbid., 
example occurs in 
pp. 20-21. 
II 
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,1 his discussion of propositions. 
I 
This is di~cuseed below. 
'li Carnar extends the notions of intensions and extensions 
to designators generally. Equivalent desi~nators have the 
same extension; and L-equivaler:t desi~nators have the same 
18 intension. He then goes about the business of choosing 
extensions and intensions for desi~nators other than 
predicators. 
As the intensions of sentences, Carnap chooses the 
propositions they express; as extensions, their truth-values. 
There is something strange about re~arding anythinp; a~ the 
extension of a sentence, since sentences, unlike predicates, 
do not seem to have a location of application. Powever, 
'Carnap argues that since sentences can be taken as predicator$ 
of degree zero (i.e., predicators having no occurrenees of 
free variables), and since extensions are what predicators 
have in common if equivalent, the choice of truth-values 
as the extensions of sentences is rroper.l9 
Carnap does not explain whether truth-values are or are 
not linguistic or mental. But propositions as intensions of 
sentences are supposed to be, according to Carnap, non-
,linguistic and non-mental. Like properties, propos'tinns 
are supposed to be "something objective that may or !"'aY not 
,be exemplified in nature.n20 
Again, while this vague characterization mi~ht be 
,accepted for true sentences, the pro!=ositions expressed 
19Ibid., p.26. 
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'by false and L-false sentences seem no more objective or 
' 
j non-mental than do empty or L-errpty properties. 
The reason for this parallel between the dlffic•Jl ties 
jof propositions and properties is teat Carnap rep:ards 
pror:ositlons as com::>lex entities consistinp: of the intension 
of the individual expression or expressions an~ the intension j 
of the intensions of the predicator or predicators. 21 Thus ~~ 
the argument that propos! tions need not be experienced in ·I 
order to be understood is the same as that for compound 
, properties: knowledge of the components suffices. 22 
'I 
What is important in this discussion of rropositions 
is Carnap's closing comment, for it amounts to nothing more 
or less than abandoning epistemology so far as propositions 
are concerned. 
It has been the purpose of the preceding remarks to 
facilitate the understanding of' our conception of 
propositions. If ••• a reader should find these •• 
more puzzling than clarifying, or even unacceptable, 
he may simply disregard them. They are not a necescary 
basis for further discussions in ttis book •••. It 
will be sufficient for nearly all our rliscnssions 
involving propositions to assume that they are entities 
of any kind fulfilling the following two C('n'! i tions: 
(1) to every sentence in a semantical system ~, 
exactly one entity of this kind is assigned bv the 
rules of S; (2) the same entity io assip:ned to two 
sentences in S if ani onlv if these sentences are 
L-equivalent.23 
But :tt -does not- se~m- t-hat. Carnap can abandon the 
epis terr,ology of propositions and still maintain that 
prepositions are Intensions of any sort, since the 
intension-extension distinction is, as noted above, an 
21Ibid., pp.J0-31. 22 Ibid., p.31. 2"3Ibid., pp.3J-~2. 
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1episterrological distinction. So long as this is so, t'lere 
][seems to be a third condition which propo~itions fulfill: 
ijthe epistemological condition of being ~omething that a 
1:' ·-
i!listener understanrls in understanding a sentence, 
Apparently, Carnap does not reo-_a-r>d t'lis epistemoloi"ical 
condition as necessary. In fact, he regards the entire 
discussion of the nature of propositions as extra-svstematic 
and as "marginal notes with the purpose of supplying to the 
reader helrful hints or convenient pictorial associat'ons 
whlch may make his learning of the use of the expressions 
easier than the bare system of rules would do, 1124 He 
compares this discussion to "the ether 
visualiza t ·_ons of physical theories. . 
picture 
,25 
• • 
or other 
Now, it is very difficult to accept the notion of 
this discussion as either extra-systematic or comparable to 
a picture of the theory. Certainly, since the bounds of the 
system have not been explicitly drawn, Carnap's assertion 
that this discussion is extra-systematic is not a concluslon, 
And again, since the theory is not one that appears in need 
of a picture, the analogy he provides seems improper. 
Carnap 1 s notion that the :Jiscussion is extra-systematic 
appears to be a stipulation of the boundary of the system. 
'That is, Carnap appears to be simply registering his desire 
to avoid discussing the issue, However, his characterization 
of intensions as what is understood in understanding a 
designator appears to rest upon an unstated epistemology 
24Ibid •• p. 211. 25rbid, 
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llof language. For an intension, and especially a proposition 
i/ i,s non-linguistic. And hence, Carnap appears to be assert in# 
that designators, e.g., sentences, are understood by II 
understanding some non-linguistic entity of some sort. 
'[Certainly, since this is ~n assertion of the existence of n 
:[non-linguistic intermediary in the process of understanding 
j' a designator, it is an epistemological position of a sort. 
rl It would seem that some further snecification of this 
position is required if the characterization of intensions 
is not to_be·guatQitous. 
I: It is interesting to note that while Carnap has 
I' 
rl 
tr 
I, 
:r 
I' 
I I, 
II 
il 
'I 
!I failed to explain how in "tensions are the vehicles or inter-
1 
I' 
.1'.'.· mediaries in the understanding of designators, he has ,j 
!
1 provided several definitions of 'understand' which have 
I! 
II 
!I remarkable consequences for his theory. 
I 
i! Carnap does not define 'understand' or 'know the 
'meaning of' for designators generally, but he has defined 
them for sentences in at least three of his ~orks. 
To know the meaning of a sentence is to know in which 
of the pos~~ble cases it would be true and in which 
not. . . • 
To understand a sentence, to know what is asserted by 
it, is the same as to know under what conditions it 
would be true.27 
The semantical system ••• contains rules which yield 
for each sentence Zi ••• a truth-condition £i such 
26 Ibid., p. 10. 
I' 
li ,, 
;I 
I 
27Rudolf Carnap, Introduction to Semantics 
Harvard University Press, 1961), p. 22. 
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that Zi is true if and onlv if pi, Once this truth-
condiTion l2i is obtained, we "unaerstand" Zi, we know 
what it "savs" about the individuals of thedomain in 
question, what its "mean<ng" is. Zi saye that ri, i.e., 
••• the individuals ar~pof such a!nature that tEe truth-
condition is satisfied,c~ 
None of these definitions requires anv notion of 
propositions or intensions of any sort, As Carnap says of 
the language system Sl; 
The rules of truth together constitute a recursive 
definition for •true in Sl 1 , because they determine, 
in combination with the rules of designation, for 
every sentence in Sl a suffic29nt and necessary 
co~dition of its truth •••• 
Hence, the introduction of propositions as vehicles for 
understanding sentences appears to be unnecessary, 
It is difficult to see why Carnap, having such si~ple 
definitions of •understand' for sentences, took up with 
r:roposi tions. To explain the understal'ding of sentences by 
the understanding of certain rules is to explain one kind of 
linguistic understanding by another. Such a procedure could 
avoid epistemology to the extent that the phrase 'understand 
the expression' could be left to some psychologist to define. 
This WC''ld not be as complete, nor therefore as satis 'actory, 
as a semantics which included a psychological definition 
of this phrase, but it would be far more satisfactory than 
2PRudolf Carnap, Introduction to Symbolic Logic And 
Its Applications, Trans. William H. MeYer and ,Tohn Wilk-inson 
(New York: Dover Publications, Inc., 195' 0 ), p.lOl. 
29carnap, Meaning and Necessity, p.5. 
:1 
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Carnap's awkward dismissal of the need for the epistemolo~ical 
characterization of eristemological entities. 
It is unfortunate that Carnap ha8 not offered definitions 
for •understand' for individual and predicate expressions, 
for these might have shown that there is no need for intensions 
as vehicles for understanding of these kinds of expressions 
either. 
Now, it seems rossible to construct definitions for 
•understand' consistent with the given definition for 
sentences for those non-sentential designators. One such 
definition might cover all non-sentential desip-nators definir;g 
them as understood if the sentences in which they occur as 
components (i.e., subjf3cts or predicates) are understood. Such 
a definition might appear to be too demanding a requirement 
if •the sentences in which they occur as components' is taken 
as •all the sentences in the language system in which they 
can appear as components•, especially in a system wrich has 
a very large number of individual and predicate exrressions. 
On the other ~and, changing 1 the sentences in which they 
occur as components• to •at least one sentence in which they 
occur as components• might appear as not demanding enough. 
This latter difficulty appears to be more apparent 
than real. It also appears to be a result of carrying over 
notions resulting from reflection upon ordinary langua~e, 
which lacks exr:lici t and unambiguous rules of designation, 
to formal language systems which do have exrlicit and 
" 
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unambiguous rules. In ordinary Enflish it is not unu8ual 
:for one predicate, e.g., 1 steal 1 to have different usages 
which alter the truth-value o:f the containing sentence, e.r., 
•Jones steals home•. In a formal language this can be avoided 
by stipulating in the rules of designation for the predicate 
constant 1 St 1 either 'steals (in baseball)' or 'steals (in 
law) 1 • 
Hence it seems likely that a non-sentential nesignator 
can be defined as understood i:f at least one sentence in which 
it occurs as component is understood. 
Taking 1 Bs' .in Sl as an example, the sentence is 
understood, accoroing to Carnap's definition, i:f its truth-, 
or truth- and falsity-, conditions are known. 'Bs r is 
understood, then, since it is known to be true if Scott is 
a biped, and false i:f not. And since the non-sentential 
designators alone supply only the designata 'Biped' and 
'Scott•, understanding o:f them in such a case consists only 
in knowing the relevant rules of designation. 
However, it does not seem wise to redefine, on the 
basis of this very simple example, the term •understand' as 
applied to non-sentential designators generally. Such a 
definition, e.g., a non-sentential desirnator is understood 
.if its rule of designation is known, r'ight be acceptable for 
predicates, b~t it does not seem to be for individual 
expressions. For, amor:g the individnal expressions are not 
only constants such as 1 s 1 (in SJ) but also descriptions 
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such as 1 (ix)(Axw) 1 (in Sl), and these individual descriptions 
can f'ail of' uniqueness of reference. The exar'ple '(ix) (Axw)' 
f'ails in just t~ose cases where there is not exactly one 
author of' Waverly, i.e., where there are none or several. 
In such cases of' f'ailure, Carnap, f'ollowin~ Frege, assigns 
a;r as the referel'lt of' the description. 'I'ne purpol'e of' this 
is to ensure that every sentence in the system has a trutb-
value and that every desi~nator designates. In a E'VI'te~ such 
as Sl, which is a thing langua~e, a• is called 1 the null 
t' ing'. It is th~t thing which is part but not all of' 
every thing. In a system whose individuals are numbe~s, 
al~ could be 0; in one whose individ~"als are, or include, 
classes, the null class.3° 
Now, the relevance of this to the def'inition of' 
•understand' f'or individval expressions is that there are two 
cases where a sentence such as 1 B(ix)(ANW) 1 is f'al~e: (1) 
where the author of' Waverly is not a biped and (2) where there 
is not exactly one author of' Waverly. This second case would 
be neither true nor f'alse except f'or some rule such as the 
assignment of' al~ as the referent of' the f'aillng descrjotion, 
Hence understanding of' the sentence requires knowledge of' 
this r\'le as well as the rules of' designation. In aildition, 
a rnle rray be needed stating that any atomic sentence with 
a'~ as an individual constant is L-f'alse. 
There is another problem, resulting f'rom Carnar's 
30 6 Ibid. , pp , 3 -3 7 • 
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failure to give the rule of truth for sentences such as 
•B(lx)(Axw)•, as to the tr,Jth-conditions of sentences 
involving individual descriptions. The problem is wJo.ether 
the conditions under which such statements are true are 
adequately given by assertions such as 1 the author of '.i'averly 
is a biped• or whether the individual (if there is one) 
must be specified b:<t vsing its proper name, If the inrHvidual 
must be specified by using its proper name, then, aside from 
certain sentences, the truth-conditions of sentences 
containing indi vidu.al descriptions (as components) cannot 
be given by the rllles of designation and truth alone, In 
addition, the knowledge is needed that, e.g., the author of 
Haverly is Scott. Thoce sentences with indivic'.ual descriptions 
as components which are exceptions to this are those with an 
identity connective, i.e., •is(the same as)•, e.g., •the 
author of vlaverly is {the same as) Scott 1 and 'the aut"' or of 
Waverly is the author of Waverly•, 
It does not seem necessary to req,"ire specification of 
the individual by proper name, for, whatever is the "lescriptum 
{if there is one) of the individual description either is or 
is not, e.g., a biped. And in general, since most thin~s 
do ncct have proper names, this deman.d for specification by 
proper name is undesirable; it would lead to truth-value 
gaps. 
So, takir:g this definition of 'understand' for individual 
and predicate expressions, it can be seen that such under-
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standing does not require intensions of any sort. As in the 
case of understanding sentences, knowledge of rules of truth 
and designation (taking the assignment of a~< as a rule of 
designation) suffices. 
Of course, this is not Carnar's definition, but one 
constructed on the basis of his definition. As such, it 
appears to offer a way which he could have avoided intror.ucing 
intensions of any kind. 
If intensions are unnecessary as vehicles of understand-
ing for designators, then, since tb.is is apparently their 
basic function, they seem not to be needed at all. 
However, as extensions are supposed toresult from the 
application of :ntensions, the elimination of intensions seems 
to reqcire the elimination of extensions as well. Hence, 
the elimination of intensions appears to create a gap in the 
semantical schema. 
It might be asked why this lack of intensional or 
extensional characterization of the schema is a gap in anv 
sense. The clearest answer to this is that, without some 
characterization of tris sort, there is no way to state 
precisely under what conditirns two terms, esrecially general 
terms, are coextensive. The need for intensions or extensions 
for expressions other than terms is less clear. 
Reinterpreting the Carnapian schema wholly by classes, 
so as to avoid the dif ficul ties with propeC"ties noted above, 
.seems unobjectionable. Such a reinterpretation does not alter 
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II tte notions of state-description and L-tr1: tr; these are 
l1 independent of intensions, extension, and properties, 
:i 
On such a reinterpretation, any predicate, being a 
general term, refers to its corresponding class, e,g,, 
'human' refers to the class of humans, The problem of 
whether this should be taken as a class given by enumeration 
or by rule can be easily solved. Taking classes given by 
enumeration as the referents of predicates, there is the 
-y-
'1 ,,
!i 
problem that any enumeration can contain at most a denumerably 
infinite number of names, Hence, the predicates could not 
include, e.g., 1nurnber 1 , or any other for which there is, 
or might be, a greater number of members in the reference 
class. 
Taking the referents of predicates as classes given by 
'r1_1le, this problem does not arise. Since there is no 
enumeration there is no restriction of the numbe~ of members 
in the reference class, 
It might be thought that taking classe~ p:iven by rule 
as the referents of predicates entails the denial of the 
distinction between the merely happenstance coextension 
supposedly exemplified by the pair 'man' and 'featherless 
'biped' and the formal coextension supposedly exemplified 
by the synonym pair 'man' and 'rational animal'. This need 
cot be so. Synonyms can be distinp:uished from merely 
coextensive terms by occurring as the non-logical components 
in L-truths of the form 'All and only P are Q'. Such r.-tr11ths 
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stipulated in the s emantical rules 
-T-
of stipulated L-tr11ths. For 
example, supposing 'All and only men are rational a~1mals' 
and 'All and only rational animals are laufhinf animals' 
are both L-tr"e, then •mar' and 'lau?hing animal' are 
synonyms, This is perhaps better seen in the case of 
mathematics. For it is commonly stated that '9 equals 
3 -sq':ared' is logically true even though there is no srec ial 
rule in mathen·atics stating t!'lis as an L-truth, 
The referents of other terms, individual constants and 
descriptions, can be chosen easily. For individual 
constants, the individual. For descrirtions, the individual 
or, in case of failure, the null class, 
This last choice ensures not only that everv term has a 
reference, and hence that every sentence has a truth-value, 
but it also.ensures, if eert!l-ia-f'ul.es_.!U'e-observed,., that 
every full sentence with a failing individ11al designator 
is false, 'Ihese meal"ures are, if anytl:oing, clearer here 
than in the original Carnapian interpretation, for thev 
consist simply in understanding the copula of the sentences 
of the language as 'is an element of•, and in demrinp: that 
the null class is an element of any clasA for which there is 
i a descriptive predicate, Hence, e, g., 1 The sole author 
of PrinciEia Mathematics is a horse' is false on set-theore-
tical grounds, since the null class is not an element of 
the class of horses. The gain in clarity of this over 
Carnap 's choice of a;, as the null thing is that wherea!' the 
, 
I 
' ,,
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;1 'Ihe characterization of these terms seems sufficient 
1: 
1
: interpretation for the purposes of this section. Since 
statements are not terms, it seems an error to say that they i 
have referents.3 1 
To use this referentially interpreted schema to explain 
synonymy and anal;1ti city be':laviorally, it is neces ~ary to 
present and semantically re-describe certain anthropological, 
archeoloP'ical, and psychological data, and to interpret tbe 
schema by them, 
The situation here is very sim.ilar to that of the re1atim;! 
of an explication to what it explicates. 'Ihat is, the 
semantical schema is not a literal reproduction of this 
data but is a formal specification of the logico-semantical 
aspects of the data. It is imrortant to recognize that the 
data could be used for a different theory, even a theory 
using an intensional semantics. This is not a failing of 
the present theory, but is to be expected, since no data will! 
i 
serve for only one theory. However, here the earlier comment$ 
•' 
; on the gain in economy and clarity res11l ting both fro!'! the 
' 
:abandoning of r:roperties and of intensions generally are 
'relevant. The present theory mav not be the onl" one 
imaginable but it seems to be one of the rrore clear and 
economical._ 
31Quine, Word and Object, p.201. 
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CHAPTER III 
This chapter contains an informal interpretation of a 
11semantical model. The model is, of course, the extensional or, 
i: 
\~eferential revision of Carnap 1 s sche~a which was discussed 
ll':in chapter two, 
1\ 
There is, basically, one reason why thi~ interpretation 
,~s called 1 informal': the se!l'antical notion that a predicate 
,, 
'btands for a class is loosened. Strictly speakinp:, t'-1is makes 
!' 
ithe work of this chapter something other than an interpretation 
', 
i ~f this particular scheFa. However, as the predicates a~e 
' ~onsidered to stand for collections of a sort w~ich Vygotsky 
:I 
:1 1 . ?alls 'complexes' and as these collectlons are clas~-like, it 
foes not seem wholly improper to consider the present efPort 
tn informal interpretation. 
I This studv, unlike Quine's study of applied semantics in 
Word and Object2 does not consider lanp:ua~e behavior. Rather, 
,, 
I 
~t is study of conceptualization, i.e., of primitive artifacts 
~nd culture and of the preschool child's orpanizational 
~ehavior, 
This approach expresses the consideration that 
conceptualization is possible apart from language. Quine 
1 L.S.Vygotskv, Thought and Lanf!uaae, ed. ancJ trans, 
Euger,ia Eat.tfmann and Gertrude Vaker (New York: John 1-liley 
and Sons, 1962), pp. 6lff, 
2 Quine, Word and Object, chap. ii. 
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~I appears to disagree with this, writing "Conceptualization--on 
I, 
l,any considerable scale is inseparable from lanp;uape, , • :' 
I 
flit is likely that t"'is disagreement is only arparent. Quine•a 
' 
'-dictum appears to be relevant only to contemporary scientific' 
conceptualization, not to the conceptualizations of children 
or of primitive man. 
The data for this study are drawn from the writings of 
L.S. Vygotsky and V. Gordon Childe,4 It suggests not only 
that the analytic could have arisen out of such conceptualiza-
tions, but that it is likely that it did, 
The experimental study of concept formation whose 
results are summarized by Vygotsky proceeds by a method he 
terms 1 doe1ble stimulation.' That is to say: "Two sets of 
stimuli,~e presente~ to the subject, one set as objects of 
his activity, the other as signs which can serve to organize 
that activity,> The first set of stimuli, the object~are: 
22 wooden blocks varying in color, shape, height, and 
size, There are 5 different colors, 6 different shapes, 
2 heights (the tall blocks and the flat blocks), and 2 
sizes of the horizontal surface (large and small). On 
tl::e unde-"side of each figure, which is not seen by the 
subject, is written one of the four nonsense words: 
~. bik, ~· ~· Regardless of color or shape, lag 
is written on all tall large figures, bik on all flat 
large figures, mur on the tall small ones, and cev 
on the flat smarr-ones, At the beginning of the--
3Ibid., p.J, 
4v, Gordon Childe, "The Prehistory of 
Archaeological Documents," The Evolution of 
S, Metraux and Francois Crouzet (New York: 
Library, 1963). 
>Ibid., p.56. 
Science: 
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all blocks, well mixed as to color, size 
scagtered on a table in front of the 
and ~lJ 
• • 
The other set of stirruli, the sivns which can serve ~I 
!I 
to or.c-ani ze the subject 1 s ac ti vi ty1 are given by the examiner. 1 .. 
1 
At the beginning of the experiment. • • • tb.e examiner 
turns up one of the blocks (the "saFple"), show:> and 
reads its name to the subject, an~ asks him to pick out 
all the blocks which he ttirks might belong to the same 
kind, After the subJect has done so. • • the examirer 
turns up one of the 'wrongly" selecten blocks, shows 
that this is a block of a different kind, and encovra9:es 
the subject to continue trying. After each n0w at1empt 
another of the wrongly placed blocks is turned up. 
The point of these stimuli is given in the following: 
As the number of the turned blocks increases, the 
subject by degrees obtains a basis for discovering to 
which characteristics of the blocks the nonsense words 
refer. As soon as he makes this discovery the 
••• words ••• come to stand for definite kinds of 
objects ••• and new concepts for which the language 
provides no names are thus built up • 
• • • the use of concepts has a definite functional 
value for the performance required by the te~t. 1,/hether 
the subject actually uses conceptual thinking in 
trying to solve the problem ••• can be inferred from 
the nature of the groups he builds and from bis 
procedure in building them: Nearly every step in his 
reasoning is reflected in his manipulations of the 
blocks. The first attack on the problerr•; the han·Hing 
of the sample; the resronse to correction; the finilirg 
of the soluticn--all these. • • rrovioe data that can 
serve as indicators of the subject's level of tloinking,f1 
In addition to the application of these newly developed 
concepts to th,e block problem, Vygotsky indicates that the 
subject is led to (1) use the concepts in talking of other 
6Ibid., PP· 56-5?. 
?Ibid., p.5?. 
8 Ibid., p.5?. 
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objects, and {2) a define them generally,' 
Vygatsky asserts that his studv has shown that the 
formation of genuine concepts begins only at ruberty and 
that, until then, other intellectual formulations or 
function of concepts. There 
1
notions more or less perform the 
1are, says Vygotsky, three phases in this development, each of 
which is itself divided into stages. 
The first phase is generally one of unorganized 
heaps or congeries of disparate elements. The word, i.e., 
•cev 1 , 'bik', 1mur 1 , or •lag 1 , "denotes nothing ~ore than a 
.vague syncretic conglomeration of individual obiects that hav 
somehow coalesced into an imare in his mind.nlO Because it 
is eclectic, says Vygotsky, this image, and the corresponding 
concept, is unstable, but it can be used for communication 
with adults especially if the conversation is about, or refer$ 
to, the concrete objects of the child's habitual environment.U 
The three stages of this phase differ onlY in the kind 
of syncretic heap formed, In the first sta~e, the heap is 
created at random, each object added as a guess. In the 
experiment, this was evidenced by the child's replacement 
of only the one block that had been shown to be wrongly 
chosen. 12 
Spatial position largely determines the formation of 
the second stage's hears. Vygotsky says these heaps are 
formed by "a rurel:v syncretic organization of the child's 
9Ibid. 
l~Ibid., pp. 59-_§0. 
11~., p. 60. 
12Ibid. 
--------- ---
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~~ The third stage is a combination of the first two. 
,I 
!The heaps formed are formed from elements of the different 
[heaps that have already been formed. This is a two-step 
1
!operation, but remains at -ohe purely syncretic level. 
IIAlthough Vygotsky does not explicitly say so, it seems 
,, 
lilikely that the formation of che g;roups of the third stage 
ljnroceeds merely by trial and error selection from the 
igroups present to the child's attention. 
The second phase Vygotsky calls 'thinking in com-
-:·:..r: __ 
i 
I plexes'. It differs from the first phase in that the groupsj 
are formed mainly on the basis of bonds or relations 
observed to hold between the _;bjects. These bonds, e.g., 
color or shape similarities, are objective, i.e., recogniz-
able by the examiner. In this chey differ from the associa-
tions of phase one. 
Vygotsky notes tnat adult lantuage contains some 
,thinking of this sort. :B'arr;ily names, he says, express the 
,factual and concrete relationships existing in che child's 
complexes. As Vygotsky puts it, "Tne child at thac stage of 
development thinks in family names,. . . che universe of 
indiviaual objects becomes organized for him b;y being 
['rc)uped into separate, mutua.Lly related 'f'amilies'. ,l4 
•:rhe point of calling thes~ families is, as noted above, 
I 
' 
1 that the relations in complexes are concrete and factual 
·,rather chan abstract. Perhaus the word 'family' is too 
l3Ibid. 14Ibid., p. 62. 
64 
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]suggestive of a definite and unchanging rule of grouping. In 
:fact 1 as Vygotsky presents therr, the varioue complexes 
lfare not formed by any one definite rule but are formed by 
']various and varying kinds of associative rules. 
i '!here are five basic types of complexes, the first of ilhic~ is characteriz.ed by having as a nucleus the sample 
llblock. The other blocks are arlded to t'1is on the basis of 
i! !any noticed bond or similarity or contral't. Proximity, which 
!figured in the formation of the heaps of the first phase may 
!I ,, 
11 ~lso be used. The word here, e. g. 1 cev 1 if' not a prcoper name 
~~ut a kind of family name in the sense of holding of a 
~~i versel y related call ec tion. l5 
I 
1
! The second type of complex has, apparently, two forms. 
I 
I,The first of these two forms is formed by first taking some 
I !11attribute of the sample, e.g., its color, as the basis, and 
' 
' !lthen slipping to some other attribute, e.g., shape as the 
i' 
' lbasis. It differs from the first in that, apparently, the 
' 
1
i
1
lresul ting collection has fewer different rela tiona .16 
I 
:1 Vygotsky notes that this is a long and persistent stage 
!: 
l,in the child 1 s development which is rooted in the child's 
lprac tical experience. He points out that certain call ec tiona 
I 
1
pf this type, e.g., place settings, sets of clothes, are 
I 
I 
1
rart of the child's habitual environment and do serve as 
I 
1
1
)nodels for building collections. Hence there is, apparently, 
,, 
'i 15Ibid., p. 62. 
' 
I 16~ •• p. 63. 
,I ,, 
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18. grading off of collections of the first form of this tvpe m 
I 
1
ithe second form, which is formed on the basis of these 
,practical models. Vygotsky suggest that these are groupings 
l1on the basis of participating in the same practical 
I 
! 17 
',!operation. 
li 
'! The third stage in the phase of complex formation is 
lithe third type of complex, the chain complex. 
ljto the first form 
This is similar
1
j 
II 
I 
of the second type in that the rule of 
,lassocia tion is not constant throughout, or across, the 
licollec tion. 
!I 
But there is a difference: there i~ no nucleus. 
ITha t is to say, each link added to the chain is as important 
,, 
~~or the choosing of the next block as waE the sample for 
!lchoosing the second block. This means, of course, that the 
sample may be disregarded in choosing the third or any later 
' 
ijblock in the chain. 
i 
According to Vygotsky, the concrete nature of the 
,formation of complexes leads them to have a vague and 
ifloating quality. This phrase 'vague and floating' is meant 
to apply not only to the varying nature of the relations 
ibetween elements, but also to the variance between subjective 
'relations (t"lose due to "a dim impression that they have 
I 
,!something in common 11 18)and genuine relations holdi.rlg between 
!the objects. 
This vague and floating cp ali ty, according to Vyp-ot~ky, 
17~. 
18~ •• p. 65 • 
. . .. . ~.~-.C 
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'::leads to the fourth type of complex, the diffuse complex. 
This kind of complex is, apparently, a variation on the 
chain complex, Here a yellow triangle may be followed by 
I 
!trapezoids "because they make him think of triangles with 
'their tops cut off, 1119 To quote Vygotsky, 
Trapezoids would lead to squares, squares to hexa~ons, 
hexagons to semicircles, and finally to circles, 
Color as the basis of selection is equally floating 
and changeable, Yellow objects are apt to be followed 
by green ~Bes; then green may change to blue, an~ blue 
to black, 
Vygotsky relates this kind of comples to "the child's 
generalizations in the nonpractical and nonperceptual areas 
,I 
1
lof his thinking, which cannot be easily verified through 
\'ferception or practical action, ••• n21These, he says, 
:lare "the real-life parallels of the diffuse cornrlexes observed' 
II', 
j,in the experiments, n22 
I 
1. '!he fifth and last kind of complex Vygotsky calls 1 the 
i' 
1 ~suedo-concept 1 because although the behavior, i.e., the 
' 
~lock-assembling, appears to be directed by a concept, 
.experimental analysis reveals that only an associative bond 
has been formed, '!hat is to say, when the examiner turns 
jover a wrongly chosen block, the subject takes, or allows 
•', 
,~o be taken, away only that particular block, '!his, although 
j! 
fygotsky does not use these terms, shows that the subject 
~as not been assembling 
19 
.!E.!£· 
20Ibid, 
the blocks according to the rule 
2llill· 
22Ibid, 
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/ 
'All murs (or~ etc,) are tall red (or short blue etc.) 
blocks. 1 Under the direction of a concept, knowled~e of an 
exception would result in discarding all but the sample 
block and beginning anew, 23 
Vygotsky asserts that these psuedo-concepts 
bridge between complexes and adult concepts24 and 
are the 
that • 
if it were not for the prevalence of psuedo-concepts the 
• • 
child's complexes would develop along different lines from 
adult concepts, , ,n25 This suggests that the attainment of 
adult concepts is a socialization of thinking, 26 and this 
suggestion is developed by Vygotsky in his extending of his 
1notion of thinking in complexes to anthropological and 
! 
!historical examples, 
After noting that some ancient languages, Hebrew, 
.. 
''Chinese and Latin, contain single words for opposities, e.g., 
i. the Romans had one word,' altus 1 ,for both high and deep, thus 
'indicating thinking in complexes, Vygotsky asserts, 
Primitive peoples also think in complexes, and consequently 
the word in their languages does not function as the 
carrier of a concept but as a "farrily name" for groups 
of concrete objects belonging together, not logically, 
but factually,27 
The child, primitive man, and the insane, much as t~eir 
thought processes may differ in other important respects, 
all manifest ••• complex thinking and ••• the function 
of words as family names,28 
23ill£.' p.67. 
24Ibid., p.66, 
25Ibid.' p,. 68 
26~ •• pp.85-86. 
27Ibid,, 
28 Ibid, 
P• 72. 
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The history of language clearly shows that complex 
thinking with all its pecul,iarities is the very foundation! 
of linguistic development,c9 
To support this contention, Vygotsky cites exa~ples 
,i 
l'from the Russian languaf!:e, The term 1 sutki 1 in the Russian 
'
11language 
! 
i 
11 originially ••• meant a seam, the junction of two 
pieces of cloth, something woven together; then it was 
used for any junction, e.g. of two walls of a house, : 
and hence a corner; then it began to be used metaphoricall,jY' 
for twilight, "where day and night meet"; then it came , 
to mean the time from one twilight to the next, i.e., 
the 24-hour sutki of the present,"30 
Other Russian words, e.g., those for cow, mouse, and 
link, also show the purely associative thinking of complexes, 
'For, according to Vygotsky, the Russian words for cow, mouse 
i;and ink originally meant 'horned', 1 thief•, and 'blacking' 
I 
I !,respectively. These, he notes, are both too broad in the 
il 
I 
lsense that not all horned animals are ccws and not all 
I 
it--laving animals are mice and not all ink is black, and too 
narrow in the sense that there is more to cows, mice, and 
ink than horns, pilferage, and black color, 
Vygotsky explains such word~ as resulting from a 
transference of name via the varied associations of complex 
thinking from the primary picture-name or complex-expression, 
:This same sort of transference, he claims, is present in 
I 
'icommon adult usage, e. g., 'neck of a bottle', 'bottleneck'. 31 
29Ibid. 
3°Ibid., p. 73. 
31Ibid,, pp.74-75. 
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. ----- The---uiTFd pnai1e In concept develo-pment is not, as 
ygotsky presents it, a phase like the first two, Rather, 
it is the traditional complementary of association or 
synthesis: analysis or abstraction. Hence, the point of 
eparating analysis into a third phase is onlv to emphasize 
that it is a different, independent root of concept 
ormation,32 
Analysis, as Vygotsky sees it, consists, at the child's 
evel at least, in the preferring of one attribute or trait 
f the object to another. This was seen in the chain 
omplexes where similarity of color or shape was chosen as 
he basis for the addition of the next block, Vygotsky 
otes that even in the first stage of complexes, those with 
nucleus, certain traits of the blocks have been given a 
referred status to the others. And, as noted abo'e, this 
referential treatment appears to become more exclusive as 
he complexes lose their nucleus and become chainlike, That 
s to say, the number and diversity of the relations of the 
amilies appears to decrease, 33 
At some point in this development of abstraction, and 
f concept-formation, the child begins to form groups on the 
asis of a single attribute, Perhaps the first occurrence 
f this is within the diffuse complex, for although the 
omplex as a whole is marked by variation of associations, 
here are patches or segments of the complex containing only 
32I!2.!.£., p. 76. 
33l£i£., pp.76-77. 
I 
12 
Vygotsky mentions something that can be taken as 
indicating the development of abstr$ction toward the formatio 
of groups built on a single attribute in his discussion of a 
different experiment. He writes, 
Sin:ple experiments show that preschool children "explain" 
the names of objects by their attributes. According to 
them, an animal is called "cow" because it has horns, 
"calf" because its horns are still small, "dog" because 
it is small and has no horns; an object is called "car" 
because it is not an animal. When asked whehter one 
could interchange the names of objects, for instance call 
a cow "ink" and ink "cow," children will now answer no, " 
because ink is used for writing, and the cow gives 
milk. "35 
Vygotsky concludes from this that the connection betwee 
word and object is so inseparable in the child's mind that 
an exchange of names wo11ld mean an exchange of characteri!'tic 
features.3 6 
What the children seem to have here is a notion of the 
proper application of a word to objects. That is, to take 
these examples, the refusal to call ink 1 cow 1 and cow 'inv' 
because ink does not vield milk and cows cannot be used for 
writing seems to indicate that the children consider certain 
features as essential for the proper application of each 
word. 
This is not to suggest that the child has an elaborate 
semantics which includes a technical notion of the propriety 
of applying a word. But, as the block experiments show, the 
34 Ibid., p.l29. 
35rbid. 
36 l£!.2·, p.l29. 
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' ~~rhlld-h~; th~ ability to ~ule -;;-~;-certain noticed feat=es 
j]as irrelevant to the formation of ("Toups. And, of course, 
ilthis ruling out of features is an excludine, of blocks having 
!(these features. In the construction o1' a diffuse complex 
' )'!the child excludes all non-blue blocks from the blue se~tion 
j[or all non-triangular blocks from the triang,le section. ::;7 
l
l'l'his same kind of exclusion applied co che things of ordin- li 
lary experience mitht result in the excluding from the group :1 
lila belled 1 cow 1 all things lacking horns, milk-giving ability 1: 
' i 
I etc. , and l'rom ·che group labelled 'ink' all things lac;. ing 1 
' ·,,1[ lrwetness or mark-making ability. 
:1 This can' .be seen as a refusal to allow ti1.e basic image 1 
,, 
]'or group of features to change as, e.g., tnose of the 
'buss ian word 'sutki' were allowed to do. That is, it might 
'I ,, 
l'be taken as a refusal to apply the term heretofore only 
I 
iapplicable to the seat of one 1 s trousers to the corner of 
i his h:mse etc. 
rn-cerpreting the refusal to apply 1 ink' to cows and 
, 'cow' to ink as an extension of the abstraction ability 
shown in block experiments might seem to miss a difference in 
!complexity between blocks and cows. 'J'hat is, a block is 
! -
,tall, short, big, little, re , blue, yellow etc.; but a cow 
I 
\;seems to be a good deal mole complex, 
This difference in complexity is obviuus to an edu-
cated adult but perhaps not to a c 1ild or an :L~norant 
peasant. As--a llltat;,er of fact, Vy~,otsky himself 
i 
__ L __ _ :?7Ibid., p. 78. 
- -, -
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uggests something of this when he notes that the original 
eaning of the Russian word for cow was 'horned•, and when he 
eports the ct-,ild•s concertion of the notion of reasonability: 
'Reasonable means when I am hot and don't stand in a 
raft." 38 Taking this as a model, the content of the refusal 
tself might be interpreted as saying that, to the child, 
•cow' means •large l::orned milk-giving animal' and 'ink' 
eans •something to write with.' 
The importance of taking the refusal as an extension 
of abstraction ability is that it shows that the child has 
some notion of essential features. And while this notion 
seems to be limited only to properties essential for the 
roper application of a word, it can also be taken as the 
·I 73 L~--
otion of the features essential for anything to be considered 
e.g., a cow. 
This perhaps more significant notion of essentiality 
seems to be expressed by the child in the following 
converse tion. 
In one experiment, the children were told that in a game 
a dog would be called "cow". Here is a typical sample of 
questions and answers: 
"Does a cow have horns?" 
11 Yes.n 
"But don't you remember that the cow is really a dog? 
Come now, does a dog have horns?" 
"Sure, if it is a cow, if it 1 s called cow, it has 
horns. That kind of dog has got to have 1 i ttle horns. 1139 
The sentence showing that the c'Jild considers horns 
n essential feature of cows is: 1 If it is a cow, it has 
38Ibid., p. 78. 
39 Ibid.,p.l29. 
---- ~ 
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jlevident not only from the earlier refuRal, but from his 
[!interpreting a dog called 'cow' as a special kind of neg. 
:[ The importance of this for the present study is that 
the child and primitive man thus seem to have working 
notions of essence. And given this, it seems that they have 
lthe basis for statements of essential predication, i.e., 
analytic statements. 
In fact, to re-examine the quoted series of questions 
1and answers, the child's replies seem to be nothing more or 
less than an explanation to the examir.er that the statement 
il'all cows have horns• is true because cows must ("fl'ot to") 
~~have horns, i. e. 1 because horns are an essent:fal feature of 
ilcows. 
If this analysis is correct, then at lea~t one of 
the behavioral aspects or bases of the analytic has been 
uncovered, or partially uncovered. That is to say, the 
analytic is a result of the notion of essence we·ich seems 
, to be a result of the dogmatic preference for certain features 
of the object. Son:e of the reasons for this dogmatism are 
given in the introduction. 
Admittedly, this account is vague, especially insofar 
as the establishing and preferring of associations is c~cer1 
ned. Part of this seems unavoidable, since there is apparent~y 
no standard or predictable set of associations 
I 
or preference~. 
-- -_____: __ .:___---::::-:::-:-_-_,-~-
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tandard. The diversity of associations was glossed over 
n the discussion of the child's notion of cow, but re-
xamination of the quotes from the interrogation experirrents 
hows that the children made different associations~ The 
irst took milk-giving as essential; the second, horns. 
xactly why this is so is not clear. 
V. Gordon·Childe has laid the diversity of associations 
nd of preferences not only to the trial and error initial 
nvestigations of primitive men but to their establishment of 
trict traditions of method as well.4° 
Childe 1 s claim that primitive men established 
raditions of method is supported by both the geographical 
i versi ty and the typological-historical continui tv of 
iscovered artifacts. Childe explains how geographical 
iversity supports this clairr: 
In fact in the same period and often in one and the same 
ecological province we often find quite different 
assemblages distinguished o~e from the other by apparently 
arbitrary divergences in types of artifact serving 
much the same purpose--- e.g., of ax, bracelet, or 
dwelling --- and often by similar divergences in the 
food eaten or the sites selected for habitation. 
Such observed arbitrary differences are attributed 
to divergences of traditiop between distinct, though 
contemporary, communities.41 
Shilarly, after noting that there are "Notoriously 
• • two ways of learning --- by trial and error and by 
xam le. n42 Childe takes what he regards as a well-documented 
xample, the manufanture of hand axes, and points out the 
40childe, op. cit., p. 36. 4 2Ibid., p. 37. 
I: 
__ } ---- 4libid., p. 36. 
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'I 
~i.mp;obablli ty of taking these as merely the r~-;ul~~~f trial 
[I and error individual work. 
i There are, says Childe, two obvious methods of making 
[,sharp-edged tools from flint or other micro-crystalline 
\[stone. The first is to chip off bits of the core until it 
jhas the desired edges and shape; the second is to detach 
flakes which themselves serve as tools. Both procedures 
require considerable familiarity not only with stone but with 
the human body as well. For, ae Childs writes, 
Just bashing two stones to~ether is not likely to vleld 
a usable flake or core tool. To produce either the blow 
must be struck with precisely the right force and at the 
correct angle on a fl~t surface --- the striking 
platform. The latter must in turn make an acute 
angle with the adjacent side of the lump and the blow 
must fall at the proper distance from the edge thus 
formed,43 
There are thousands of well-finished tools and some 
failures to show that Lower Paleolithic man had this 
technique well established, In fact, since the failures show 
the application of the same method to flawed cores, Childs 
:considers that they are better evidence for this. 44 
Both the geographical distribution and the 
~~C.C~~~~r~-_ ·~---_c·--
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li trial and error experimentation. 
,I 
'I Acd although Childe does not explicitly state this, 
·it seems that the absolute predominance of hand axes in 
I !areas bordering on areasmere hand axes are rareu5 indicates 
1not only that there is a divergence of traditions of tool-
making but also that there is, in each tradition, a rejection 
1
of nontraditional methods as well. After all, v,iven a 
!technique which can produr:e both cores and flakes literally 
at one blow, it seems odd that the core toolmakers did not 
also become flake toolmakers and vice versa. This seeming 
oddity seems to be accounted for by an orthodoxy of 
I 
'!tradition, i.e., an exclusive tradition. 
I If this is the case, then there is a parallel between 
1the child as stipulator of essences and the primitive man 
! 
i 
,as stipulator of proper methods of toolmaking. Both appear 
to reject exceptions because they lack features considered 
[essential. 
I 
1
1 Childe contends that hand axes are simplv a p;ood 
i' 
l,example of his thesis that tools are the products of a 
!'tradition. He sees no reason to restrict his thesis to hand 
!axes alone.46 He even goes further and argues that what holrls 
!,of toolmaking and the related knowledP"e of geolo~y should 
,., 
i!also hold good of hunting, agriculture, etc. 47 
'1 45rbid. 4 7 .!2!2.·, p. 41. 
I 46Ibid.' p. 40. 
I 
' 
! 
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supposing Childe 1 s contenticn-cls correct, then notions -+r--- ---
of es~entiality were wide~pread in pre~istorical tiFes, For II 
I 
li 
such notions are embodied in every technical orthcdoxy, and 
II 
'Ihese notions of essentiality, whether of procedures 1 
of hunting or toolmaking or of si"lple naming anrl clasRifving, I, 
i' 
all primitive men hunted, fished, or farmed, 
appear to be more properly taken as legislative than as 
jmerely inductive generalizations. 'Ihis can he see!' first, 
by considering the relation of such notion~ to excePtions, 
ij 
I 
i 
I 
i 
Where inductive generalizations are falsified by exceptions, 
these rules or notions count the exce-ctions a~ bo_,.,.us. This 
is shown in the child's contention that any dog called 
'cow' must have the essential properties of a cow, i.e., 
horns, It may also ~e considered to be expressed by the 
, 
absence of flake tools in the core tool areas, and vice-versa,[! 
1
For example, it is not too speculative to imagine a rrimitive [! 
ltool maker of one school refusing to call a tool made by , 
ljanother method 1 tool.' After all, such comments exist into 
, 
the present day, e.g., in the field of musical criticism. 
The second consideration illustrating the legislative 
or ~tipulative character of such notions rather than their 
character as inductive generalizations is their o~vious 
material falsity, Core tools were not the onlv kinds of 
tools made at that ti·e, Hence, it ioes not seem likely 
that these notions are siFply inductive generalizations, 
Rather, they appear to be seizures upon certain useful 
techniques discovered by trial and error and perpetuated by 
---- -- "-------- ----
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" i1 an B.F"rentice system of a sort. 
1! -
i' 
·I 
I 
;rhat is to say, to follow Vygotsky, these notions 
,, 
,, 
I :rould seem to be due nrimarily to one or several individu-
als. Gocialization of them would be due to the a~~rentice 
system. couch a system would scread them across a society or 
a nortion of it, e.g., ~he toolmakers of the s~ciety. 
There are several reasons to consider an annrentice 
system as one of •. he more imnortant 'Nays in which such 
I 
I 
First, it is a mPthod of trans-Jlnotions were socializPd. 
Jl m i_ ttine, techniques and/ or acquired knowledce. So•ne such 
il 
',I 1jmethod is necessary for any society if every venera.tion or 
li every indi vidu:J.l is not to be forced to learn by his or its 
·,I 
- own trials and errors. 
;:-;econd, as a method oi' trc,ns~r.ission, che an--rentice 
system has certain· advantages over other imar: inable mett10ds. 
For, unlike the contemnorary techniques of clac-sroom 
!education or their imae· inable outdoor vrimitive nrecursors, 
the avnrentice system is neither dependent upon the 
_existence of a develoned lanfuage or unon tne existence of 
'·an economy whL:h can support an il·dividual or iHdJ_vidusls 
who divert t\1eir activities fr.Jm the nroduction of basic 
::necessities. 
The apprentice system is one that can be carr-ied on 
without disturbing the daily round of activities necessary 
to :·.aintain life. 'l'he hunter can teach n_m:tin: •ar1ile 
hunting, am' the farmer can teach far:rrling- 1c:'tile f'arrnin[ • 
. 'J'he annrentices themP:·lves can be en:ployed in to.sks re,pir-
79 
ing little or no specialized knowledf:,e, and c<m be tested 
I by observation of their performance of more de;;;an;:;int tasks. 
'i Because the teaching is done cl'-lrin[ the nerfo:r:"n3nce II 
li of the 
I 
activities, such a system would seem to require 
'[little more language than ir:dicacor words •Jn ::he order of 
'U1is' and 'that' , or even aw ropriate [:runts. It is 
interesting to note that S'ICh a teachinf: method ·~itht well 
I 
'serve to introduce new terms into the l<mguae::e. Certain 
I, expressions which were oricinally merely indicacor ·vords 
II rnicht well become, by simple association of word and object 
11 1 
II or situation, the name of the object or situation. 
,1
111 
It is important to note that the introduction of new 
terms can of itself serve as a source of' social conceptions 
of necessary states of affairs. For some of these new name 
might well be taken as the child took 'cow' , i.e. , as 
bein§ anplicable to only thines having a feature regarded 
'as necessary. _j_n addition to this, the annrentice sy·stem 
can itself serve to introduce orthodoxies because of its 
teaching methods. For S'-lCh a method, stressing ~imicry, 
and most likely discouragir:g inr.ovation(because im ovation 
looks like error), could of itself harden even merely use-
ful r eneralizations into a.Ithoritarian stipulations. 
Although the mechanism here seems comnlex, it is no doubt 
partly that of association via the technique of rf'·Hard and 
punish:;nent. 
'l'his emphasis upon the apprentice system may be ;~is-
leading. Other factors may also have contributed fl'eatly 
80 
'I 
I 
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lltoward the formation and ;-ocialization of notions of 
I 
I jmecessary states of affairs. The sif'nificccnce of the 
:] t 0 t 0 th t 0 t 0 • h - f t l'appren 1ce sys em 1B a 1 1s a mec oa ·or rie ~rans-
:1 
~!mission of acquired techniques which not only ccm fanction 
1
iun::ler nrimitive conditions but Hhich can contribute to 'che 
Jjformation of orthodoxies as well. 
li Row, supnosin!'; this entire acco:mt is ))c;.sically 
1]correct, i.e., that there •ere sociaJ.ly recocnized stipu-
r 
~~-c!L 
·llative or lefislative truths present at least iJc'C.·l'citly in 
I
:,' the technical orthodoxies of prin:;i ti ve culture, the problem ,[ 
• remains to relate these to the extension:, 1 I ev is ion of ':j 
,Carnap' s scheme. 
The intendPd parallels in the formal scheme are the 
!:referencial stipulations or L-truths. The letislative or 
'r 
',stipulative nature of the, primitive notions seems fair,ly 
'clear both from the consideration of their I'cJlsity as 
i.material statemen~G,o o.11d of their relation to nurported 
exceptions. What remains to be shown is that these are 
referential in nature. 
It is clear that the demonstration of the referential 
,nature of the assertions of these primitive notions of 
j necessary 
! 
states of affairs is not a matter of investi['atinfc, 
i'nrirni tive language. 'l''1is would appear to be im.oossible in 
I 
' ;,any case, since there are apparently no artifacts beccTing 
'I 
:samples of these languages. In addition, as has been noted 
'previously, it seems that any sentence can be interpr:,·ted 
r' 
!. intensionally 
:! 
__ r_-_:__-
or extensionally. This is familiar case of 
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rfthe same data serving for alternative theories. In such 
'Cases consideration of the relative simTilicity of t~e 
alternative theories is necessary. 
On this score the consideralions of chapter t•JiO are 
relevant. The extensional revision of Garn:cn's scheme 
annears to be not only simPler because of the elimination 
of intensions but clearer and more familiar as well. 'l'he 
:gain in clarity is a by--nroduct of the elimination of 
i 
,intensions, since the role of intensions '.as so::rre\'rhat 
I 
',\puzzling. That is, as noted in chapter two, intensions \'Jere 
'\characterized by Carnap not only as the vehicles by which '[ 
designators are understood but as ur:necessar;y for this 
I jpurpose as well. The gain in familiarity concerns mainly 
:I 
;(the substitution of the established class calculus for 
!Carnap' s own attempted formcclization of Lhe rel2tions of -1 
,i ['I :lforonerties. 
i Ho•,-;ever, thesf' considerations concern only che formal 1\ jl il 
1! ;1 jportion of the theory. -iihat is perhaps more to the point of [1 
1: !! 
lithe interpreted theory is that the view implicit in 
,[Vygotsky' s study is c.Loser to the referential -cnan to the 
!I 
!:intensional view of 1~-tn[Uaf-'e. That is to say, vhe wor-d-
,, 
'!!complex relation in Vy[cotsky 's study is cloEer to the exten-
i'lsional term-class relation than to the intensional designa-
i'tor-intension-extension relation in several irrmortant vnws. 
1 
1
j., First, the relation of a term to a class or of a •;mrd 1 1 
I ~~ j~o a complex is basically a one-one relation. Allowing for ~~ 
!(several words to name the same class or_ cormlex, the 11 
:,I 
I 
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1:relation is at most n;any-one. 
!] 
But thF relati~n of a 
lldesir,nator to its inc;ension and it;s extension is one-two. 
r 
:I 
Second, classes and comnlexes are collections. In 
[[chis, both ci.iffer fr:Jm pronerties which, as Carn&p sees 
[[them, are physical characters of things. 
i[ The third point concerns the number of different kinds 
[iof designators. Vy[otsky :ientions cmly one kim: of designa-
[ tor--the word wh Lch is associated 'Ni th a complex. 
[lvygotsky' s view thus differs from both the intension:ocl view 
[land its extensional revision. The intensional view 
!considers sentences, individual expressions and TJ~edicate 
j 
!expressions as desi§nators. The referential revision 
I 
ljeliminates sentences as desisnators and retains the iLdivid-
l'ual and predicate expresc·ions. These become cccin[ular and 
I~ 
!
1
feneral terms, i.e., expressions referring to individuals 
'and classes respectively. 
''.hile both the intensional and the extensional views 
·appear to be quite different from Vyt:otsky 1 s view, the 
'extensional revision of Carn''P 1 s sc '1erne cun be •r,)dified to 
,brin[' it closer to Vylotsky 1 s. T'1is modificati:m consists 
! jsimnly in taking each individu::il as a class ·aiwse :c.ole 
'I 
1
1member is that individual. Tnis modif'ication is Lot Nithout 
I 
'precedent,48and it does serve to make the reL1tion of refer-· 
ence fenerally that of a term to a class. 
48
willard Van Urman .mine, IV:athematical Lore ic (rev.; 
1
cambridge: Harvard university Press, 1955) p. 135. 
83 
-:-=_:-=-+,-:.: -::--;---:-:-:_------.:=--=--:::=----=: - -=-===--= 
'I ouch a modification necessitates other small moctifi-~~cations. ·The copula, c1EiVinc, b· en 'is an ele, Pnt of', must 
l1be chcmp:ed to 'is a snbclass of'. Thus, '.'ofm is tall' 
II . 
ilbcoco"'"'s ''J'he unit class of John if: a subcla[:S of thcc cl2ss 
:! 
'liof tall things•. This h: effectively the same as '':l'he 
~~~1~d:.vidual John is a member of the class of tall thint;s'. 
lii:ilmllarly, a*, ttaving been taken as the null class, is now 
lltaken as the class whose sole member is the null clas'~. 
iiHere the former stipulation that/'·~ull claccs is not an 
l!ele!:;ent of any class for which there is a n1edicate 
]'expression is changed to the sti:mlation that the cL1ss of 
i che null clas>' is not a subclass of any clas:: for .,.,hich 
there is a predicate expression. Like d1e o':s.rlier stipu-
lation, this ensures that every fu.ll sentence itll a failin(' 
individual designator is false. 
'This modification differs from the vievJ imnlicit in 
Vy['otsky's study in tovo impor~ant N"iys. First, classes are 1 
.not complexes. l:lotn are collections, but Vygotsky'gives no 
1 infJrmation as to the identity and :cembershin conditLms of 
:complexes. From his remarks concerning the r:·enlace,nent of 
erroneously chosen blocks, it woulcl seem thEit these con-
ditions are not precise or explicit. Since classes differ 
ifrom informal collections in having precise identity and 
membership conditions, this is a sienificant difference. 
6econd, this modification contains a aistinccion be-
t:veen two kinds of classes--t.f10se Nith exactly me member 
and those w'<.ose membership is numerico.lly unspec i_fied, 
84 
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j This distinction has no parallel in VYt, otsky' s study. 
r qowever, these differences do not seem sufficient to 
il 
" 
'I 
II 
[show 'I that orimitive lant;uage, at least as Vy~otsky sees it, I: 
is non-referential. Hather, it seems possible to retard 
·these differences as differences in precision of the 
structure of the basically referential language. To regard 
che differences in this manner is, of course, co treat the 
primitive language in the manner of an explicandum for the 
, formal view as explicatum. 
I 
The point of so treating the relation of the primi-
tive language to the later formalism is to emphasize the 
il 
II 
II 
! 
'I 
I! 
I' 
'I I, 
I' 
I
' 
,I 
I 
I il ]I similarity of the two language structures. 1: 
I
ll I It is clear that classes are an improvement in pre- !1 
" : il 
cis ion over complexes. However, it may not be as clear thatl: 
i the distinction between kinds of classes is a difference of 1·
1
1 
i precision. 'This can oe seen by considering that ti1is dis- I. 
I tinction provides the basis for Lhe precise statement of the'' 
truth conditions of both singular and universal statements. 
'l'hat is to say, on the basis of this distinction be-
tween che two kinds of classes, it is possible to regard 
singular statements as of the form 'The unit class ol' A is 
a subclass of the class of B's', and to regard universal 
statements as of the form ''The class of C' s is a subclass 
I 
j of the class of D's'. Hence, it is possible to see clearly 
i I that, while singular statements assert the existence of 
I 
[jsome individual in some class, universal statements do not 
Ji assert the existence of any .i.ndi v iduals at all. Hence, a 
T 
I 
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i[ statement such as 1 All unicorns are blue-e;yed 1 is true if 'i 
\,'
1 
there are no unicorns at all. The reason for chis is that,[! 
.I 
under the usual set-theoretical interpretation, i:;he null [! 
class is '-a subclass of every class. 
Actually, since the distinction bet·.veen universal and 
singular statements is essentially a distir;c·tion of truth 
conditions it can be said t!::tat che introduction of a 
! ' 
[i 
I 
I 
,I 
1!, distinction between types of classes is the (precise) introl
1 
I duction of the different kinds of stacements themselves. 1: 
I II 
l1 And this is an improvement in the precision of the language [' 
!
1 
us a tool of expression. :11 
[, Thus, taking primitive language as referential seems 'i 
'i\ jl more 
,, 
appropriate than does taking it as intensional. fience ,
1
j 
the stipulations of the Drimitive .Language appear to be ,, 
I! i 
[. better taken as 
li it would appear 
referencial than inten:cional. And hence, lr 
,[ 
chat the assertions of pi·imi tive orthodoxies' 
" !'[can be taken as the primitive behavorial parallels to the 
I, L-truths of the formal schema. 
As this completes the account of tt1is section, it may 
be thought that this ::ccount is not an incerr,reta(,ion of 
che formal scheme but an addition to it. It is c<ertain.Ly 
I 
1', not a rormal interpretation in che sc.nse of cae p'l;; sical 
11 interpl·etation of a rrwthemucical model. 'L'hat is, there has 
'I I, 
~~~been no attempt to find behavioral or cul<-ural pare>.llels 
,] for each of the several notions of the formal 1:chema. 1 
·! Perhaps the present account is bc.st called, following ! 
a sketching Jf factors relevant to analyticity into ,[ 
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" •11 the model language. For a sketchint is, appcu cncl;y, not a 
,i formal procedure, but a dr:n:int, of the main lines. f:~ince 
tl1e problem of exolaining ancil;yticity is a complex one, 
little more than this could be atcempted here. 
11 At any rate, it would seem that the basic lines have 
,, 
il been drawn and that Carnap' s seu;antical notions of stac;e-
'1 
li description, semantical rules, explicawion, and L-tr'uth 
I (in an extensional revision) have been shoVJn to be useful 
i 
' li in e:rtJ.Laining analyticity in natural languages. 
[I 
,, 
il 
II 
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CONCLFSI0}7S 
The conclusions of this essay are the fulfillments of 
its r;urr oses. The attacks ur;on the sharp analvtic-synthetic 
distinction have been ~hown to be ill-conceived, and Carnap's 
basic semantic _method of constructing artificial languages 
has been shown to be useful in explaining analyticitY in 
natural languages, 
This is not to say that there are no proble~s with 
this method or with any of its concepts. On the contrary, 
both explication and intension require further st,Jdy. The 
relation of the explicandum and the explicatum needs further 
specification, and the need for intensions generally needs 
to be further investigated. Intensions mav not be needed 
for the explanation of analYticitY, but anaJyticitY is not 
the only problem of logical semantics. 
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ABSTRACT 
The purpose of this essay is to reply to the attacks 
upon the sharp analytic-synthetic distinction rr:ade by Q_uine 
in "Two Dogmas of Empiricism" and by White in 11 The Analvtic 
and the Synthetic: An Untenable Dualism", This essay 
attempts to show not only that these attacks are ill-conceiv-
ed, but also that Carnap 1 s se-r>Jantic methoils can 1ce 1Jseil to 
explain analvticity in natural languages, 
The two attacks are, in effect, attacks upon the 
conception of the analytic as be-ing ' definitely different 
from the synthetic. Quine's attack is directed primarilv 
at three of Carnap 1 s basic concepts--state-description, 
explication, and semantic rule, These he re~eards as separate 
attempts to explain analyticity, White attacks the claim 
that f'ome natural language has the sharp analvtic-s·mthetic 
distinction of an artificial lanruage. He does this by 
considering primarily two imagined experiments. 
Both attacks fail. Their failure is due not on1 y to 
particular failings of argument, but to more general 
'met'codologlcal misconstructions as well. In particnlar, 
!not only are each of Qvine 1 s differert attacks upon the 
several notions misccnceived, but the very method of 
.piecemeal attack is itself a risconstruction of Carnap's 
lserantic metl-:!ods, Similarly, Wtite 1 s imaf'ined experiments 
t' c 
I ,, 
,, 
il I! ,, 
2 
not only fail to demonstrate his polrtJ, but his method of 
attack arpears a methodological misconception. The failures 
_I 
T 
! 
of experiments do not entail the rej•ction of the hv~othesis. 1! 
I' 
Quine r s attack uron the notion of the sta te-dePcriptionl[ 
or rather, of the list of all state-descriptions (for a I 
lanr'uage system) consists in taking this list as a truth- jl 
table for.some compound of all the atomic statements in 
the language system and in asserting that it cannot then 
serve as a t~bular criterion of analyticity. Quine errs 
i here on two specific counts. First, the list of all state-
descriptions is not a truth table. Second, it is not a 
criterion, but a definition of analyticity. An analvtic 
statement is defined as one which is true in eve~y state-
description. 
Quine's next attack--upon explication-- is one he has 
lcome to rejedt himself. In this attack he conten1s that, 
' 
'as exrlication requires the (partial) svnonvmv of expli~andum 
and explicatum (or exrlicans, as Q•·ine has it), it rests 
on synonymy and cannot be used to explain it. However, 
Carnap never suggests that explication requires the(part;al) 
synonymy of explicandum and explicatum. In fact, Carnap's 
own explication of analytic or necessary truth, which has as 
ex licandum what Leibniz called necessary truth and what 
' 
I 
ii 
ji 
' 
art called analytic truth, illustrates the allowed divergence 
etween explicandum and explicatum. Carnap's is a semantical 
otion, not one couched in the framework of metaph'Tsics or 
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required. 
Quine's last attack--upon semantical rules--is at 
once the most patently false and the most suggestive of his 
attacks. Quine's contention that semantical rules are 
distinguisable only by appearing upon a page marked 'Semantic-
al Rnles 1 is patentlv false. Semantical r''les, like 
theorems, rules of inference, etc., are distinguished by 
function. To say, then, that a statement is true according 
assertion that some statement 
' 
II 
'I 
II 
is entailed by another accordin4! 
the semantical rules of the language system is not 
say nothing. It is to say something comparable to the 
to the rules of inference of some logical sys tern. The t is, i 
lit is to place the statement within a formal system. 
It is precisely this Jieg.±ect .; of the total formal 
schema which is Quine's nost serious error. In attacking 
these three notions eepabately,Quine has indicated that he 
has misconstrued Carnap 1 s method. The three notions are not 
I ieach ways of defining or explaining the analytic; they are 
components of a structure in which analytic statements have 
a proper place. 
However, to return to this last attack, Quine does 
make a very useful suggestion in noting that an apreal to 
artificial languafeS could he helpful in explaining 
analyticity if the relevant behavioral and c ·ltural factors 
were sketched into the simplified model. This suRgestion 
! 
! 
ji 
! 
==~~~~+-i~s~-~takenupand developed in_ the la ter~par~~o!~~'l~s- ~s~a;._ ~ t _____ _ 
II 
,I 
!I 
I' 
rl 
II Quine himself does not do so. 
1 An aiJproach such as the one suggested b;y <tuine is 
different from that taken by iihite, for .·ihite' s approach 
involves neither the investigation of behavioral or 
cultural factors relevant to analyticity nor the interpret-
I 
ation of a semantical model. Rather, .ihi te approaches the 
I! 
i' 
:I 
I 
I 
!! 
'I 
'I 
!t 
I· 
tl 
I 
i 
I, 
I two imagined exoeri- 1 problem with more direct methods. iUs 
:I 
I' 
tl 
li 
! 
II 
I! 
II 
:I 
,I 
il 
1'. 
I 
II 
·I 
!i I! 
ments, v1hich involve the interroe::ation of native subjects 
as to the synonymy of expressions, differ mainly in che 
kind of interrogation employed. The first experiment uses 
the method of ostension, i.e., pointir;g to objects, saying 
native expressions taken as 'man', and awaiting native 
assent or dissent. Since the naGives assented to neither 
the calling of non-featherless bipeds nor non-rational 
animals by the native expression taken as 'man', Ihite 
concludes that this method wil~ not distinguish supposed 
coextensives from supposed synonyms. Oddly enough, 'laving 
said this, fnite concludes that the criterion of term-
withholding, which was supposedly being applied here, ·Nill 
not help in making the distinction between coextensive 
and synonymous terms. Yet, it seems obvious that it is 
not the criterion which has failed, but the method of 
application. 
The second experiment allows Vlhi te to converse with 
I: 
li 
:I ,, 
I' 
I' ,I
:] 
t, 
I 
li 
II li 
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f" fhe natives. Ihe method ot: interrogation is verbal rather 
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il than ostensive. White asks the natives it: thev are not 
II 
!:surer in withholding the term 'man• from non-rational 
:! 
'i animals than from non-t:ea therless bipeds. And getting an 
' 
\at:t:irmative reply, White concludes that he has the making of 
:!! a criter;on hi h k th di ti ti b t ~ w c'" rna es e s no on e ween synonyms 
! 
il and ooextens ives merely a rna tter of degree. He asserts 
I 
li that rational i tv is merely a better sign of manhood than is 
!I t:eatherless-bipedity, 
I 
These are obviously non-seq1liturs. Not only are 
degrees of felt certainty coFpatible with as deep an 
analvtic-synthetio distinction as is imaginable, but replies 
to questions such as this one do not produce criteria. 
Turning to Carnar's semantic methods thereselves, both 
to support the replies to Quine and to develop the semantical 
model with which to develor Quine's suggestion, the essay 
becomes somewhat more technical. Aside from the many 
details, the key point of this discussion is the status of 
intensions in Carnap 1 s scheme. In particular, propositions 
seem an unnecoessary complication, Not only are propositions: 
! 
!supposedly the intermediaries or vehicles in the understanding 
1 
of sentences, but Carnap defines 'understand' for sentences 
: in such a way as to indicate that propositions are not 
:necessary for the understan'ling of sentences. 
On the basis of this definition of 'understand' for 
,.sentences, a definition of •understand' for non-sente!'tial 
I 
i designators is constructed. Ihis has the effect ~, renilering 
- -~c-cJ=cc- .. -_-_ --- --- ---------
1 
!I ~1 
~~~t inton,nno =~~~,;,;r;f;o~~ho ;pi~;;:m~l ngioo;~;;~;~; _L•s 
,j 
:tiew. Since the epistemological function appears to be 
,their most basic function, this appear8 to be a methocJ of 
i 
eliminating inter:sions altogether. Following this, Carnar's 
fscherra is reinterpreted extensionally, i.e., whollv in 
_terms of classes and elements or members of classes. 
I 
li 
model 
The resulting extensional scheme is then used as the 
into which behavioral and cultural factors relevant 
to analyticity are sketched. 
The behaviora-l factors relevart to analyticity are, 
first, the child's and, apparently, primitive man's natural 
:I propensity to think in complexes or association groups and 
secondly, his propensity to prefer, after a ti!l"e, certain 
associations to the others. This leads the child to insist, 
e.g., that cows must have horns. Hence, the child is,in effecF, 
asserting 'Necessarily, cows have horns' or, in other wor~s 
that 'All cows have horns' is analytic or L-true. 
The cultural factors relevant to analyticity are the 
orthodoxies which spread such preferences across a soc!ety 
or a portion of it. Such orthodoxies, according to V. Gr·rdon 
Childe, were the rule in prehistorical times. They appear 
·to be the resc;lt of the two wa"s of learning open to 
primitive man--by trial and error and by example. And 
since experimentation is suicidal for primitive peotles 
living at the level of economic subsistence, those that 
, survived and aided in the formation of our cc·lture established 
orthodoxies. 
-~-·~- Hence,_ ana_lyti_c sta_tem,ents form a par:t_cofour 
7 
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cultural heritage from prehistorical times. ~t 
Now, strictly speaking, classes are not the same as 
I 
i complexes. Classes have definite identi t:v and membership 
conditir:ns; complexes do not. But, complexes, being 
collections according to several rules, appear to be a 
rudimentary forF of classes. Hence the interpretation of 
l1 
!i 
these factors into the revised Carnapian schema can be taken 
either as an informal interpretation of the schera or as an 
explication of the primitive conceptual sche!"e. 
In sum, the attacks upon the sharp analytic-s'mthetic 
distinction are seen not only to be ill-conceived both in 
t~eir particular details and in their more general and 
methodological aspects, but also to be erroneously directed 
at a useful contribution to the culture of man. 
-~i . 
